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THE FINANCIAL PROVISIONS OF TIE NEW
WASHINGTON BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT
RICHARD 0. KUMIERT*
The Model Business Corporation Act adopted by Washington during
the 1965 Legislative Session becomes effective July 1, 1967. The finan-
cial provisions of the New Act are in many respects very complex and
will be a matter of concern to local counsel in their efforts to prospec-
tively arrange for the transition from the old to the New Act. The
author, in the following pages, which represent the first half of a two-
part article, explores the general philosophy, policy decisions and
detailed provisions of the financial sections of the New Act. The second
half of the article will be published in a subsequent issue of the Review.**
On March 20, 1965, Governor Evans approved a new Business
Corporation Act for the State of Washington.' The New Act adopts
with relatively few changes the Model Business Corporation Act2 pre-
*Associate Professor Law, University of Washington. B.S., Illinois Institute
of Technology, 1953; M.B.A., Northwestern, 1955; LL.B., Stanford, 1961.
** References to the second half of the article will be cited as "infra Part II"
with the particular subject matter heading also given.
'The new Washington Business Corporation Act, which was introduced as House
Bill No. 60, was passed by the House on March 5, 1965, by a vote of 89 to 0, passed
by the Senate on March 10, 1965, by the vote of 45 to 1, and repassed by the House
on March 11, 1965, by the vote of 84 to 0. The act appears in Wash. Sess. Laws 1965,
ch. 53. It will hereinafter be cited as "New Act."
2 ABA-ALI MOD L Bus. Coap. AcT (1964) (hereinafter cited as "Model Act').
Apart from differences discussed in text following, the more important substantive
differences between the New Act and the Model Act as revised in 1962 are:
1. New Act § 26 vests the power to adopt, alter, amend or repeal by-laws in the
shareholders except where the articles of incorporation vest the power in the
directors. Model Act § 25 vests this power in the directors except where the
articles of incorporation give it to the shareholders.
2. New Act § 32, first sentence, omits a clause in Model Act § 30 which provides
that a quorum can never be less than one-third of the shares entitled to vote at
the meeting.
3. New Act § 36 adds provisions to Model Act § 32 clarifying the mechanics of
creating and extending a voting trust.
4. New Act § 47 qualifies the Model Act's prohibition (§ 42) on loans to officers
and directors where the loan is approved by holders of two-thirds of the voting
shares.
5. New Act §§ 48(5), 55(8) and 58, require that only $500 need be received by a
corporation as consideration for shares before it can commence business whereas
Model Act §§ 43(e), 48(g) and 51 require $1,000.
6. The New Act requires filing of copies of various documents with the County
Auditor's office (see, e.g., New Act § 56(3) requiring a copy of the articles of
incorporation to be filed with such office) while the Model Act has no such
requirement (compare Model Act § 49, with New Act § 56 on filing of articles
of incorporation).
7. The New Act contains its own fee system (see New Act §§ 134-47) rather
than the fee provisions in the Model Act (see Model Act §§ 120-29).
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pared and revised 3 by the Committee on Corporation Law of the
American Bar Association. Washington thus joins a significant number
of states that have based revision of their corporation statutes either
in whole4 or in part upon the Model Act.
This article will, for several reasons, be primarily concerned with an
analysis of the financial provisions of the New Act and the extent to
which these provisions change existing Washington law, rather than
with a general analysis of changes wrought by the New Act. First, the
provisions regulating corporate finance are an important portion of any
new corporation act and are particularly important in the case of the
New Act because of the extent of their departure from prior law.
Second, the financial provisions 6 are among the most complex in the
New Act and thus will probably cause more problems for practitioners
than the Act's remaining provisions. Finally, the impact of remaining
provisions of the New Act upon Washington law has received comment
elsewhere.'
Preliminarily, some consideration must be given to the effect of the
adoption of the New Act provisions on the rights of shareholders in
corporations organized before its effective date. The New Act states
' The Model Act, which is based on the Illinois Business Corporation Act, was
first published in substantially its present form in November 1950. In 1953, a revised
edition and a volume of official forms were published for distribution through the
Committee on Continuing Legal Education of the American Law Institute. Addenda
to the act were made in 1955, 1957, 1959, 1962, and 1964. See 1 MODEL BUSINESS
CORPORATION AcT ANNOTATED V (1960) (hereinafter cited as "MODEL ACT ANN.")
and 1962 addendum thereto.
For forms geared to the Model Act, see ABA Comm. ON CORPORATE LAwS, OrFi-
ciAL FORMS FOR USE UNDER THE MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION AcT (rev. ed. 1953);
50LECK, MODERN CORPORATION LAW (1960).
Thus far no source has collected all the cases in the Model Act jurisdictions that
interpret provisions in the act. The task could be performed in connection with the
MODEL ACT ANN. but there is no indication that the American Bar Foundation has
such intentions.
'According to the editors of MODEL ACT ANN., Wisconsin, Oregon, District of
Columbia, Texas, Virginia, North Dakota, Alaska, Colorado, Iowa, Wyoming,
Utah, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Nebraska have based statutory revision of
their corporation laws substantially upon the Model Act. See 1 MODEL ACT ANN.
4.02. Arkansas (see 1 P. H. CORP. SERv. REP. BULL. 21.6 [April 7, 1965]) and South
Dakota (see 1 P. H. CORP. SERv. REP. BULL. 26.5 [June 16, 1965]) have adopted new
corporation acts based on the Model Act since the most recent annotation to MODEL
ACT ANN.
'Maryland, North Carolina, Alabama, Connecticut, and New York, according to
the editors of the MODEL ACT ANN., have used Model Act provisions in varying
degrees in the modification of their corporation laws. See 1 MODEL ACT ANN. ff 4.02.
The determination as to which of the New Act provisions is a financial provi-
sion has been made arbitrarily on the basis of the existence of a counterpart provi-
sion in article 5 of N. Y. Bus. CORP. LAw. The New Act, unfortunately, offers no
easy organizational device by which such provisions can be located.
' See Comment, The Model Bushess Corporations Act--"An Appropriate Starting
Place," 38 WASH. L. REv. 538 (1963). See also the annotations to each section of
the Model Act in MODEL AcT ANN.
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that its provisions will apply as of July 1, 1967,8 to all existing corpora-
tions organized under any general incorporation act with respect to
which the state has reserved the power to amend and which are re-
pealed by the New Act.' Whether or not adoption of the act will have
this broad-ranging effect depends upon the viability of the Washington
Supreme Court's decision in State ex rel. Swanson v. Perham."°
Swanson involved a corporation organized before the adoption of
the Uniform Business Corporation Act whose by-laws, in accord with
pre-Uniform Act law," provided that shareholders would not be per-
mitted to cumulate their votes for the purpose of electing directors.
The Uniform Act, which stated that its provisions would be applicable
to any corporation formed under a general corporation act,," made
cumulative voting mandatory.'3 The issue presented was whether
adoption of the Uniform Act, without more, deprived the majority
shareholders of the right to vote their shares "straight." The court
upheld the majority's right to elect all of the directors, reasoning,
alternatively, first, that a state, even with the reserve power to amend
New Act § 167.
Although a twenty-seven month period between the enactment of a statute and its
effective date may seem inordinately long, the period appears warranted in view of
the adoption of the Uniform Commercial and Model Probate Codes in the same
session and the possible need for amendments, and hence a legislative session, before
the effective date of the statute.
' New Act § 161 provides:
The provisions of this act shall apply to all existing corporations organized
under any general act of this state providing for the organization of corporations
for a purpose or purposes for which a corporation might be organized under this
act, where the power has been reserved to amend, repeal or modify the act under
which such corporation was organized and where such act is repealed by this
act. Neither the enactment of this title nor the amendment or repeal thereof,
nor of any statute affecting corporations, shall take away or impair any liability
of [sic] cause of action existing or accrued against any corporation, its share-
holders, directors or officers.
New Act § 166 lists the acts or parts of acts which are repealed.
Because of § 161, the New Act will not cover corporations formed under special
acts and under general incorporation acts when the state had not reserved the power
to amend. Washington reserved the power to amend corporate charters and statutes
in article 12, § 1 of its constitution; the first general corporation act following the
adoption of the constitution was adopted in 1891. See 1 HiLL, GENERAL STATUTES
AND CODES OF WASHINGTON 522 (1891). Hence, by and large only those business
corporations formed prior to 1891 are potentially outside the New Act. This number
has undoubtedly been substantially reduced because of liquidations, reorganizations
with corporations covered by general corporation statutes with reserved power in the
state, and the general principle that corporations can become subject to the provisions
of a general corporation act merely by trying to take advantage of its provisions. See
7 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CoRoRATIoNs § 3728 (1964 rev. vol.).
"30 Wn. 2d 368, 191 P.2d 689 (1948). See also Stewart v. Johnston, 30 Wn. 2d
925, 930, 195 P.2d 119 (1948) (dictum).
U Rem. Rev. Stat. § 3812, which was in effect when the corporation was organized
in 1919.
WXVASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.900 (1958).
"WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.290(3) (1958).
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corporate charters, could not constitutionally pass laws amending
corporate charters in such a way as to "impair the contractual relations
or rights of stockholders among themselves or existing between them
and the corporation," 4 and second, that the right of majority share-
holders to vote their shares "straight" was a valuable vested right
which was preserved by the Uniform Act's provision that the act did
not "impair or affect ... any right accruing, accrued or acquired ...
prior to the time this act takes effect." 5
Discussion of the court's constitutional ground logically must begin
with the Dartmouth College case'6 in which the United States Supreme
Court held that a corporate charter constitutes a contract between
the state and the corporation which is protected by the impairment of
contracts clause of the federal constitution. Mr. Justice Story stated
by way of dictum, however, that a state could, incident to its contract
with the corporation, reserve power to amend the charter; 17 and most
states,' 8 including Washington, 9 have made such reservations. Of the
considerable number of cases that have considered the permissible
" 30 Wn. 2d at 381, 191 P.2d at 696.
The court distinguished Looker v. Maynard, 179 U.S. 46 (1900), where the United
States Supreme Court upheld a Michigan statute making cumulative voting mandatory,
on the ground that the corporation in Looker was one in whose affairs the public was
vitally interested. The court felt that the corporation in Swanson was "simply a
private corporation in whose affairs and management the public has no interest or con-
cern whatever." 30 Wn. 2d at 384, 191 P2d at 698. This analysis seems specious in
view of the fact that both publicly-held and closely-held corporations were regulated
by the Michigan statute and that a decision like Swanson affects both types of corpor-
ation.
'1 30 Wn. 2d at 374, 191 P.2d at 693. The statutory language quoted appears in
WAsH. REV. CODE § 23.01.920 (1958).
" Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
The holding was soon expanded to the notion that a corporate charter constitutes a
contract between the corporation and the state, between the corporation and its own-
ers, and between the owners themselves. See, e.g., Western Foundry Co. v. Wicker,
403 Ill. 260, 85 N.E.2d 722 (1949). This third proposition, reinforced by partnership
notions, could be taken to mean that unanimous approval of the shareholders is
required for every charter change-unless the state reserved the power to amend the
charter and could thus prescribe lesser voting requirements by amendment. The need
for legislative power to amend in such circumstances is clear. See 1 BALLANTINE &
STERLING, CALIFORNIA COR'ORATION LAws 6 (4th ed. 1965).
Although the court in Dartmouth College rested its decision on the impairment of
contracts clause, any current constitutional attack on a new corporation act is likely
to be based on the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Gibson, 7he
Virginia Corporation Law of 1956, 42 VA. L. REv. 603 (1956) ; Note, Limitations on
Alteration of Shareholders' Rights By Charter Antendinment, 69 HAmv. L. REv. 538,
540-41 (1956).
17 17 U. S. (4 Wheat) at 712 (concurring opinion).
"8 See 7 FLETCHER, Op. cit. supra note 9, at §§ 3668-72, for citations.
" WASH. CONST. art. 12, § 1 provides:
Corporations may be formed under general laws, but shall not be created by
special acts. All laws relating to corporations may be altered, amended or re-
pealed by the legislature at any time, and all corporations doing business in this
state may, as to such business, be regulated, limited, or restrained by law.
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scope of a legislature's power under a reservaton clause, very few
have accepted the Swanson interpretation which permits a state to
amend only those aspects of the corporate charter affecting the cor-
poration's relations with the state.2" The great majority of courts have
considered the reservation of power to be a part of the shareholder's
contract, with the result that the shareholder is deemed to have con-
sented in advance to the state's exercise of a power to amend the
charter or to authorize the majority to do so.2 Since adoption of the
majority view would result in uniform application of the corporation
laws and in greater corporate flexibility,2" and since minority share-
holder's rights can be protected by means other than allowing them to
block corporate change,23 the Washington court, when faced with the
' See, e.g., 1 BALLANTINE & STERLiNG, op. cit. supra note 16, at 6-7 and cases cited
at 7 n.18.
The Swaanson court relied on Garey v. St. Joe Mining Co., 32 Utah 497, 91 Pac. 369(1907), in support of its restrictive interpretation of Dartmouth College. The Garey
court had held that the reserved power could only be used "for the benefit of the state
and of the public and for public purposes." 91 Pac. at 374. As Lattin, A Priner on
Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1 W. REs. L. REv. 3, 7 (1949), points out, "public
purposes" connotes use of the state's police power. It is clear that the state requires
no reservation of power in order to use the police power to regulate corporate affairs
in the public interest. See LA=-IN, CoRoIATIoxs 498 (1959). Hence, if the reserva-
tion is to have any effect it must be given a broader interpretation than that sug-
gested in Garey. But even if the narrower construction is adopted it should be rela-
tively easy to demonstrate a public interest in corporate regulation. See, e.g., Davis
v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157, 142 Atl. 654, 657 (1928). But see
Swanson, 30 XVn. 2d at 383-84, 191 P2d at 698, where the court seems to find a public
interest in regulating publicly-held corporations but not in closely-held corporations.
" See, e.g., LATTiN, op. cit. supra note 20, at 500; Gibson, supra note 16, at 603,
607; and cases cited in 7 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 9, at § 3674. 2 MODEL AcT ANN.§ 142 ff 4 states the issues under the majority view as:
[T]oday if the legislative change is within the reserve power, and the corporate
action is authorized by such legislation, the required procedures are followed,
and there is no one equitable oppression of the minority shareholders, sharehold-
ers rights can be changed.
Although the majority view is premised on the assumption that shareholders have
contracted away their customary due process protections against arbitrary state ac-
tion, it seems clear that totally capricious state action would not be within the share-
holders' consent See Note, Limitations on Alteratio of Shareholders' Rights By
Charter Amendment, 69 HARv. L. REv. 538, 541 (1956). But adoption of a well
accepted general corporation act would hardly seem capricious.
' See, e.g., Gibson, How Fixed Are Class Shareholder Rights, 23 LAw & CON-
TrEUp. PROB. 283, 290-92 (1958).
' Two basic forms of protection for minority shareholders in such circumstances
are the general equitable limitations on majority shareholder action which operates
to the disadvantage of the minority, see generally Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162
F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947) ; Lattin, Equitable Limitations on Statutory or Charter Pow-
ers Given to Majority Stockholders, 30 MIcH. L. REv. 645 (1932) ; LA=TN, op. cit.
supra note 20, at 511-15; BALLANTINE, Co0roRATIoNs § 278 (1946), and statutes
giving dissenters to the corporate change an appraisal right See, e.g., WAsH. REv.
CODE § 23.01.450 (1958). On the difficult question as to whether an appraisal statute
precludes equitable protection in the absence of fraud, see Matteson v. Ziebarth, 40
Wn. 2d 286, 242 P.2d 1025 (1952) ; Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stock-
holder's Appraisal Right, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1189 (1964).
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issue, should reject its constitutional analysis in Swanson in favor of
the majority position.
It also seems unlikely that the court's second ground-statutory
protection of vested rights-will be a factor in future litigation. Most
courts have now rejected the concept that contractual shareholder
rights are vested, partly because of the illusory nature of a "vested"
right24 and partly because of the general recognition of the need for
power to effect necessary corporate change." But even if the court
should continue to recognize the vested rights concept, it appears
that the provisions of the New Act could still be applied. The New
Act's saving clause provides only that the enactment shall not "take
away or impair any liability of [sic] [or?] cause of action existing or
accrued against any corporation, its shareholders, directors or offi-
cers." 6 This provision appears to have been drafted with a view to
overcoming the protection given vested rights in the Swanson case, -27
for it departs from the Model Act provision which refers to "rights
accrued or established."2 Thus, if faced with the Swanson issue under
the New Act, the court presumably would have to conclude that the
legislature desired the provisions of the act to apply to all corporations
irrespective of any concept of vested rights. 9
2 See, e.g., Davison v. Parke, Austin & Lipscomb, 285 N.Y. 500, 35 N.E.2d 618,
622 (1941), where Judge Desmond stated:
So it seems that only confusion results from saying that "vested rights" are
not within the contemplation of the statute. All preferential rights of stockhold-
ers are in a sense vested. They are all property rights founded upon contract. The
right of priority in the distribution of corporate assets on dissolution is no less
vested than the right to be paid dividends for past years out of contingent future
profits. The inadequacy of the "vested rights" test is further demonstrated by the
fact that new stock may be issued with preferential rights to the assets of the
corporation upon dissolution and to dividends superior to the preferential rights
of the then outstanding shares . . . even superior to the right of preferred stock-
holders to dividends in arrears. . .. The judicial problem is not whether a par-
ticular preferential right is vested or not, but rather what was the legislative
intent as to it.
See also BALLANTINE, op. cit. supra note 23, at § 277; Note, Limitations oft Altera-
tion of Shareholders' Rights By Charter Amendment, 69 HARv. L. REv. 538, 542-43(1956).
See Gibson, How Fixed Are Class Shareholder Rights, 23 LAw & CoNIT',P.
PRoB. 283, 290-91 (1958).21New Act § 161.
" The provision was added by a House Amendment to the original Model Act
provision.
' MODEL AcT § 143.
' The discussion above is not meant to suggest that as a matter of legislative
policy greater protection should not be given to minority shareholders in connection
with fundamental corporate changes. Thus, for example, it can be argued that a
minority shareholder losing the right to vote cumulatively as a result of an amend-
ment authorized by the New Act should be allowed dissenters' rights. The question
as to what protection a shareholder ought to receive, apart from being able to block
change, is beyond the scope of this paper. However, see, e.g., Lattin, Minority and
[VOL. 41 :207
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Since Swanson no longer seems viable, possible "vested rights"
problems raised by the adoption of the New Act will merely be noted
in the following discussion of particular provisions of the act.
I. SECURITY CHARACTERISTICS
Both the old act and the New Act, in accordance with modern
enabling act philosophy,30 afford participants in a corporate enterprise
relatively complete freedom in planning its capital structure.'I How-
ever, the New Act has proscribed a number of security provisions in
situations where adhesion contracts might otherwise result, and hence
should be carefully reviewed before any proposed capital structure is
put into operation.
A. Classes and Series of Shares
Both the new32 and old 33 acts empower corporations to issue the
Dissenting Shareholders' Rights in Fundamental Changes, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
307 (1958).
'Katz, 77w Philosophy of Mid-Century Corporation Statutes, 23 LAw & CoN-
TEMP. PROB. 177, 179-81 (1958), classified the philosophies manifested in modem cor-
poration acts into four categories: first, those that are "enabling" in the sense that
the parties have relative freedom in allocating risk, control, and profit; second, those
that are basically enabling in spirit but that formalize the way in which certain
determinations must be made and provide rules applicable in the absence of deter-
minations by the parties; third, those that restrict the freedom of parties to allocate
risk, control, and profit where the particular type of allocation might jeopardize the
interest of some participant; and fourth, those that establish that corporate powers
should be exercised not only in the interest of shareholders, but also in the interests
of employees, customers, and the national interest. It seems reasonably clear that both
the New Act and the old act would be categorized as enabling acts under this formu-
lation. As to why most modern corporation statutes are enabling, see Latty, Why
Are Business Corporation Laws Largely "Enabling"?, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 599 (1965).
No attempt will be made in the analysis that follows to criticize the new provisions
simply because of the fact that they are enabling. The draftsmen of the Model Act
set out not with the view of abandoning present statutes in favor of revolutionary
ideas but rather with the objective of presenting "a well-organized code of the best
in existing statutes without substituting entirely new concepts of corporate law."
ABA-ALI, MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATON AcT V (rev. 1950). Therefore, each of the
new provisions will be examined with the view of determining whether in fact they
represent the best in existing statutes.
On the general subject of planning corporate capital structures, see 4 CAvITcH,
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS §§ 87.01 - 91.05 (1964); 1 HERWiTZ, BUSINESS PLANNING
1-121 (temp. ed. 1963) ; Garrett & Garrett, What Every Lawyer Should Know About
Financhg a Corporation, 42 ILL. B.J. 82-88 (1953); Herwitz, Allocation of Stock
Between Services and Capital in the Organicatul of a Close Corporation, 75 HARv.
L. REv. 1098 (1962) ; Palmer, Choosing The Share Structure of a Washington Busi-
ness Corporation, 37 WASH. L. REv. 557 (1962).
"' New Act § 15 1 1.
A minor annoyance in dealing with the New Act is its apparent inconsistency in
numbering paragraphs in the various sections. In some sections, all paragraphs are
numbered. See, e.g., New Act § 16. In others, none are numbered. See, e.g., New
Act § 18. In still others, some are numbered and some are not. See, e.g., New Act §
48. So that references to some rather involved provisions can be as precise as possible,
unnumbered paragraphs shall be referred to as "ff" with the numbers in order of their
appearance. The New Act's paragraph numbers (in parentheses) will be used when-
ever they appear.
sWASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.130 (1958).
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number and classes of shares,3 4 with or without par value, stated in
their articles of incorporation35 with such designations, preferences,
limitations and relative rights as set forth therein. The New Act omits
the old provision36 that all shares are equal absent charter provisions
to the contrary, but this result is clearly implied by other provisions
of the New Act3 7 and would obtain even in the absence of statutory
provisions.38
The New Act specifically authorizes39 (as the old act did by implica-
"Both acts provide that the units into which proprietary interests in a corpora-
tion are divided are to be labelled "shares." See New Act § 3(4) and WASH. REV.
CODE § 23.01.010(6) (1958). A "shareholder" under both acts is one who holds one or
more shares of the corporation. New Act § 3(6) ; WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.010(7)
(1958).
The terms "shares" and "capital stock," although quite different, see Gose, Legal
Significance of "Capital Stock", 32 WASH. L. Rxv. 1, 4-5 (1957), have frequently
been confused in statutory draftsmanship. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.120(2)
(1958). These difficulties were avoided in the operative sections of the New Act
modeled upon the Model Act (which contains no definition or important usage of
the term "capital stock") but crept into the fee provisions of the New Act. See New
Act § 3(15) ; New Act §§ 137, 138, 139 and 146.
' Hereinafter the articles of incorporation will be referred to simply as "articles."
Other types of articles shall be referred to by full reference.
"' WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.130(3) (1958).
' See New Act § 33 giving each outstanding share one vote unless the articles
reduce the voting power of the class. See also the statement in New Act § 16(1) that
all shares of the same class shall be identical except for permissible variations
between series in the same class.
' General equality in rights of shares of the same class has long been an aspect of
corporate stock. See Scoir, THE CONSTITUTION AND FINANCE OF ENGLISH, ScorrIsH,
AND IRISH JOINT STOCK COMPANIES TO 1720, 44-45 (1912).
'New Act § 15(2), (3) and (4).
The New Act facilitates payment of preferred dividends through the inclusion of a
"nimble" dividend provision, which is discussed in text infra Part II under the heading
"Nimble Dividends." New Act § 45(1). Also, dividends on shares having a cumulative
preferential right to receive dividends may be paid out of capital surplus simply by
board of director action. See New Act § 46 1 2 and discussion in text infra Part II
under the heading "Operation of Basic Dividend Limitations." Distributions can not
be made to other classes from capital surplus unless cumulative dividends on preferred
clasess have been paid. See New Act § 46(3) and text discussion infra Part II under
the heading "Operation of Basic Dividend Limitations."
The New Act protects liquidation preferences of preferred or special classes in
several ways. In the event that the shares have no par value, only consideration in
excess of the amount of their involuntary liquidation preference can be allocated to
capital surplus. See New Act § 20 1 2 and text discussion infra accompanying n.278.
Dividends from current and accumulated earnings may be paid only if the net assets
of the corporation after the payment exceed the aggregate preferential amount payable
in the event of voluntary liquidation on preference shares. See New Act § 45(1) and
text discussion infra Part II under the headings "Operation of Basic Dividend Limita-
tions" and "Nimble Dividends." A similar limitation is placed upon distributions from
capital surplus. See New Act § 46(4) and text discussion infra Part II under the
headings "Operation of Basic Dividend Limitations." No redemption or purchase of
redeemable shares can be made which would reduce the corporation's net assets below
the involuntary liquidation preference of shares having prior or eaual rights on invol-
untary dissolution of the corporation. See New Act § 68 and text discussion infra Part
II under heading of "Share Redemptions and Purchases." Finally, no reduction of stated
capital can be made which would reduce the corporation's stated capital to an amount
less than the aggregate preferential right of preferred shares having a liquidation
preference plus the aggregate par value of all issued shares having par value but
[VOL. 41:207
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fion) 40 corporations to create shares with rights to cumulative, non-
cumulative, or partially cumulative dividends, and with a preference
over other classes of shares in the assets of the corporation upon
liquidation and with respect to dividends." New to Washington,
however, is the provision that a class of preferred or special shares
may be issued in series42 which must be identical, except as to dividend
no liquidation preference. See New Act § 71(5) and text discussion infra Part II
under the heading "Reductions of Capital."
There are a number of ways in which the capital contribution of junior shares-the
preferred shares' "cushion"--can be withdrawn under the New Act without the con-
sent of the holders of such shares: (1) redeemable junior shares can be redeemed from
stated capital (New Act § 6(4)); (2) junior shares may be repurchased from capital
surplus (even arising from the senior shares) if authorized in the articles or by a two-
thirds non-class vote (New Act § 6 1); treasury junior shares, although repurchas-
able only if sufficient earned surplus is available (or capital surplus, if authorized), upon
cancellation reduce stated capital and restore the surplus source (New Act § 6 ff 2) ;
dividends may be paid by wasting asset corporations out of their depletion reserves to
the complete extent of all stated capital (New Act § 45(2)); and stated capital of
junior shares can be reduced by simply a non-class two-thirds vote (see New Act § 61)
and the funds made available for distribution. The efficacy of statutory amendments af-
fording greater protection to preferred shareholders will be considered in the discussion
of each of the operative sections. Absent statutory change, the preferred shareholders'
only recourse is contract provisions in the preferred shares agreement protecting
against specific risks noted. See in this connection Buxbaur, Preferred Stock-Law
and Draftsmanship, 42 CALr. L. REv. 243, 255-57 (1954).
' WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.130(1) (1958), speaks of "preferences." See also
WASH. REV. CODE § 23.01.440 (1958), dealing with redemption of preferred shares;
Hay v. Big Bend Land Co., 32 Wn. 2d 887, 204 P2d 488 (1949) (cumulative preferred
shares with liquidation preference unchallenged) ; Hay v. Hay, 38 Wn. 2d 513, 230
P.2d 791 (1951) (same); and Larsen v. The Lilly Estate, 34 Wn. 2d 39, 208 P.2d
150 (1949) (participating preferred shares with liquidation preference unchallenged).
By way of general comparison with the rights of preferred shares under the New
Act noted in the previous footnote, the old act contained no nimble dividend pro-
vision but did allow dividends generally from capital surplus. See WASH. REV. CODE
§ 23.01.250 (1958). Such free use of capital surplus, however, allows use of capital
surplus arising from sale of senior shares to be used as a dividend source on junior
shares without consent of the senior shareholders, something not allowed by the New
Act. New Act § 46(2). The old act protected the preferred shares' liquidation pref-
erence only where the shares had a par value which was equal to the preference. See
WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.250 (1958), which defines surplus as net assets less capital
stock, which is defined by WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.010(10) (a) (1958), in terms of
par or allocated consideration. See also WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.430 (1958), relating
to reductions of capital and WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.120(2) (1958), dealing with
repurchases of shares. Finally, the old act's provisions protecting the preferred shares'
"cushion"-the stated capital of junior shares-are almost identical in result to those
noted in the New Act above with the exception that WASH. REV. CODE § 23.01.430(1)
(1958), dealing with reductions of capital, requires a two-thirds vote of all share-
holders. See WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.440 (1958), concerning redemptions; WASH.
REv. CODE § 23.01.120(2) (1958), concerning repurchase of shares.
" For a recent article discussing the use of preferred shares in planning the capital
structure of a closely held enterprise, see Herwitz, Allocatitn of Stock Between Serv-
ices and Capital in the Organization of a Close Corporation, 75 HARv. L. REv. 1098
(1962).
For problems in drafting preferred stock agreements, see Hay v. Hay, 38 Wn. 2d
513, 230 P.2d 791 (1951) ; 4 CAVITcH, op. cit. supra note 31, at § 88.03; 2 HERWITZ,
BusiNzss PLANNING 211-23 (temp. ed. 1964) ; and Buxbaum, supra note 39.
'WAsH. REv. CODE § 23.01.130(1) (1958) permits classes of shares. Series are
usually defined as subdivisions of classes. The significance of the differentiation
was clearly illustrated in Ellerin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 270 F.2d 259
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rates, terms of redemption, amounts payable on liquidation, sinking
fund provisions, and terms of conversion.43 The directors may estab-
lish such terms to the extent authorized in the articles.44 Prior to the
issue of any shares of a series established by the directors, a statement
setting forth the relative rights and preferences of the series as so fixed
must be delivered to the Secretary of State.4
The principal item of controversy in connection with these provi-
sions is the amount of discretion to be given to directors in fixing the
terms of a series of preferred stock. The New York bar recently
convinced its legislature that the provision discussed above should be
rejected in favor of unlimited director discretion on the ground that
"many large and small corporations will be greatly handicapped in
their customary methods of financing through serial preferred stock
issues, if the permissible variations between series are restricted as in
this section."4 However, unlimited director discretion has been criti-
cized by the commentators because of the possible creation of a prior
preferred without the consent of the series adversely affected.47 More-
over, the principal reason for director power over serial preferred
terms is usually said to be to enable directors to tailor the security to
meet changing market conditions without the need of time consuming
shareholder approval.4" It is hard to believe that directors by varying
(2d Cir. 1959), which held that for purpose of § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, ownership of 10% of a "series" did not make the shareholder the owner
of 10% of the "class."
New Act § 16(1).
"New Act § 16 (2).
Consistent with present law, WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.400(4) (1958), existing cor-
porations may create new classes of shares having rights and preferences prior to
shares of a particular class with the approval of a two-thirds vote of the shares of the
junior class. New Act § 62(7). Under the New Act, such corporations, with a vote
of two-thirds of all shares and the class concerned, may also divide shares of a
particular class into series and fix and determine the rights of the series or authorize
the directors to do so. New Act § 62(8).
' New Act § 16(4) (b).
" N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Committee on Corp. Law and the Ass'n of the Bar of the
City of New York, Committee on Corp. Law, JOINT REPORT ON PROPOSF. NEW YORK
Bus. CORP. LAW 10 (1961). The provision finally adopted is N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§ 502.
" See, e.g., LATTiN, CORPoRATIONS 449 (1959) ; Berle, Corporate Devices for Dilut-
ijg Stock Participations, 31 COLUm. L. REV. 1239, 1264 (1931). But see LArrIN &
JENNINGS, CASES ON CORPORATION LAw 1001 (1959), where it is argued that directors
have the power under most statutes to issue bonds and debentures without shareholder
approval (see New Act § 5(8)), that the line between debt and equity is blurred
enough so that directors should have the same power with respect to preferred stock,
and that protection of the preferred against creation of a prior preferred should be
done by covenants in preferred shares agreements. The added director flexibility,
however, seems minimal and does not seem to outweigh the risk to preferred share-
holders that may arise from a failure to cover the situation by contract provision in
drafting.
'See 11 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5284.1 (rev. ed. 1958) ; LATTIN, COR-
PORATIONS 48 (1959).
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the terms potentially within their control under the New Act provision
will not be able to produce a marketable series. Hence, that provision
should be retained as a satisfactory compromise between the possible
dangers of prior preferred creation and the need for financing
flexibility.
B. Voting
Although both acts49 provide that generally each shareholder shall
be entitled to one vote per outstanding share5" on each matter sub-
mitted to a vote at a shareholders' meeting, both also provide that
articles of incorporation may limit, deny, or provide special voting
rights for the shares of any class,5 ' to the extent not inconsistent with
the provisions of each act. 2 Limitations as to voting rights will not
apply under either act to action by shareholders upon article amend-
ments adversely affecting the non voting share's interest 3 nor will
they apply under the New Act to most mergers or consolidations, 4 or
New Act § 33; WASH. REV. CODE § 23.01.290(1) (1958).
o New Act § 33 excludes treasury shares and shares held by another corporation
from the category of outstanding shares, if a majority of the shares entitled to vote
for the election of directors of the other corporation is held by the corporation.
nComnpare New Act § 15, with WASH. REV. CODE § 23.01.130(1) (1958). The old
provision states only that "shares of a corporation may be divided into classes with
such... voting power... as may be provided in the articles... ." Hence it was
arguable that the articles could not deny voting power to a class of shares. But
WASH. REv. CoDE § 23.01.400(4) (1959), clearly recognizes such denial in the articles
as does Larsen v. The Lilly Estate, 34 Wn. 2d 39, 208 P.2d 150 (1949) (by implica-
tion). See also General Inv. Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 87 N.J.Eq. 234, 100 Atl.
347 (1917), holding, under similar statutory language, that a corporation had author-
ity to issue a class of common shares without voting rights.
Nothing appears in either act to prevent giving several votes to a class of shares(for a discussion of where such flexibility is useful, see Seamans & Barger, Multiple
Votes Per Share, 16 Bus. LAw. 400 (1961)), or only a fractional vote per share to a
class.
rVAsH. REv. CODE § 23.01.130(1) (1958), does not contain this limitation though
it is implied in WASH. REv. CoDE § 23.01.400(4) (1959).
'New Act § 62; WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.410(4) (1959).
New Act § 62 specifies the situations in which non-voting shares will be allowed
to vote on a particular measure. WASH. REv. CoDE § 23.01.400(4) (1959), covers most,
if not all, of the situations specified in the new provision by permitting non-voting
shares to vote "if an amendment would make any change in the rights of the holders
of shares of any class, or would authorize shares with preferences in any respect
superior to those of outstanding shares of any class...."
This seems to be the result dictated by New Act § 75 1 2 which, after requiring
approval of the merger or consolidation by the holders of two-thirds of the shares
entitled to vote thereon in each constituent corporation, states: "any class of shares of
any such corporation shall be entitled to vote as a class if the plan of merger or con-
solidation, as the case may be, contains any provision, which, if contained in a proposed
amendment to articles of incorporation, would entitle such class of shares to vote as
a class." See 3 HERwITZ, CASES ON BusiNEss PLANNING 600 (Temp. ed. 1964). See
also New Act § 62 for amendment provisions that would enfranchise non-voting shares
to vote as a class. But see 1 MoDEL AcT ANN. § 14 f 4 where the draftsmen comment
that "under the Model Act as revised in 1962 the articles may eliminate from any par-
ticular class the right to vote on merger or consolidation... !' If the effect described
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to shareholder actions to authorize distribution of capital surplus."
On these matters, corporate action requires a majority (capital surplus
distributions) or two-thirds (article amendment, merger, or consoli-
dation) vote of all outstanding shares." In the case of the specified
amendments to articles, mergers, or consolidations, a two-thirds vote
of the class of shares affected is also required.17
Considerable differences of opinion exist as to when non-voting
shares should be enfranchised. For example, the Model Act originally
provided, in addition to the provisions of the New Act noted above,
that voting limitations would not apply to shareholder actions on sales,
leases, mortgages, and other dispositions of all or substantially all
assets not in the regular course of business,"5 voluntary dissolution,"D
and revocation of dissolution." A number of states adopted the Model
Act in this form.61 However, these provisions were deleted in 1962,
apparently 62 on the grounds that the protection afforded to non-voting
shareholders was not worth the loss in corporate flexibility and that
shareholders were adequately protected in the event of merger or sale
of assets by their dissenters' rights.63 However, California6 4 and other
in text was desired, a more appropriate statement would have been "eliminate only
in certain cases." And complete elimination of the voting rights in a merger or con-
solidation could result under New Act § 75 ff 2 simply by interpreting the sentence
quoted above as a means of defining when shares entitled to vote under the articles are
entitled to vote as a class on a merger or consolidation. Moreover, in the other two
situations noted in text (adverse article amendments and distributions of capital sur-
plus) where non-voting shares are enfranchised, the New Act specifically states such
classes shall vote as a class "whether or not entitled to vote thereon by the provisions
of the articles of incorporation...." See New Act §§ 46(1), 62 ff 1. Nevertheless,
New Act § 75 U 2 and its legislative history are ambiguous enough to permit the
construction suggested in text, which should be preferred for the reasons set forth
in the text paragraph next following.
1' See New Act § 46(2). A vote of the holders of a majority of all outstanding
shares is required before capital surplus can be distributed, unless the articles of incor-
poration permit such distributions.
I See WAsH. REv. CODE § 23.01.400(4) (1959), and New Act § 61(1) on amend-
ments to the articles of incorporation; New Act § 46(2) on distributions of capital
surplus; New Act § 75 U 2 on mergers and consolidations.
WAsH. ZEv. CODE § 23.01.400(4) (1959); New Act §§ 61(3), 75 U 2.
Model Act § 72.
10 Id. at § 77.
'OId. at § 82.
See Ford, Share Characteristics Under The New Corporation Statutes, 23 LAw
& CONTEMP. PRoa. 264, 265-8 (1958) for a discussion of various modifications made
in the Model Act provisions by the adopting states.
' The comments by the draftsmen on the 1962 amendments do not indicate the
reasons for the changes. See MODEL AcT ANN. Uf 4 to each of the sections concerned.
' See New Act § 82(2) giving dissenters' rights to any shareholder of the selling
corporation.
See 1 BALLANTINE & STERLING, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAWS 364-65 (4th ed.
1965). California requires all shareholders to vote on purchase of shares out of
reduction surplus and on loans to directors. Compare, however, the New York posi-
tion. N. Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 804.
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jurisdictions" in which commercial flexibility is important and which
provide equivalent dissenters' rights, cite even more situations in which
voting restrictions will not be recognized than were cited in the original
Model Act. Shareholders owning non-voting shares in Washington
corporations will not lose special voting rights as a result of adoption
of the New Act provisions 6 and future shareholders will, of course,
be able to enlarge their voting rights in organic-change proceedings by
contract provisions. Nevertheless, absent some clear showing of harm
to the corporation from enfranchisement of non-voting shares in con-
nection with organic changes, it would seem that protections as basic
as the right to vote should not depend upon the alertness of counsel but
rather should be granted by statute.
A pronounced difference in treatment exists between the acts with
respect to cumulative voting: the old act required that shareholders
be given the right to multiply the number of votes to which they were
entitled times the number of directors to be elected and to cast all such
resulting votes for one or more candidates,67 whereas the New Act
permits this privilege to be denied if the articles so provide.6" In the
case of existing corporations, the New Act allows amendment of the
articles to remove the privilege69 or to classify boards of nine or more
See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32 §§ 157.14, 157.28 (1955), which provide that each
share of stock shall be entitled to one vote on all matters.
" As was implicit in the text discussion at note 57 supra (concerning when non-
shares will be entitled to vote, the old act required simply that two-thirds of the
voting power approve the changes. See WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.470 (1958)(merger), WASH. REV. CODE § 23.01.390 (1959) (sales of assets), and WASH. REv.
CODE § 23.01.530 (1958) (dissolution). Hence, the non-voting shareholder has not
lost the right to vote on any of the organic changes considered above. The share-
holders' dissenters' rights position, however, may have been slightly better under the
old act, at least if the language of WASH. REV. CODE § 23.01.450(1) (1958) to the effect
that "any shareholder who did not vote in favor of such corporate action" is inter-
preted to include shareholders who could not vote on the issue. Dissenters' rights
under this provision extend to amendments in corporate purpose and changes in the
rights of outstanding shares, or considerably beyond the New Act provision.
SWASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.290(3) (1958).
New Act § 33 ff 3.
' See New Act §§ 60, 61 and 33 ir 3. On the potential "vested rights" question
raised by such an amendment, see Maddock v. Vorclone Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 39, 147 Atl.
255 (1929).
Washington corporations with a significant number of California shareholders
and offices in California should consider the implications of Western Air Lines, Inc.
v. Sobieski, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961), in connection with any proposed amendment
of articles to eliminate cumulative voting. The court there held that amendment of
a foreign corporation's articles to eliminate cumulative voting constituted a sale of
securities under the California Securities Act and that the elimination was not fair,just, and equitable as required under the act. See Weinstein, Problems in the Field
of State Securities Regulation: A Preview of Western Air Lines, 10 CATHOLIC U.L.
REV. 1(1961); Note, 49 CALiF. L. REv. 974 (1961); Note, 72 HARv. L. REV. 1180
(1959).
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directors 70 upon approval of holders of two-thirds of the shares en-
titled to vote thereon.
The principal question raised by the New Act provision is, of course,
whether cumulative voting should have remained mandatory. The
question is one on which the draftsmen of the Model Act have differed,
as is manifest in the fact that the Model Act as originally presented
made cumulative voting mandatory"' whereas the current revision of
the act offers alternative provisions for mandatory and permissive
cumulative voting. 2 Whether cumulative voting should be mandatory
would seem to turn ultimately on a comparison of the value of at least
potential minority representation in the corporation's affairs with the
management disharmony that such representation may engender. 73
Most of the states recently undertaking major corporate-law revisions
have found the management harmony interest superior and have
adopted the permissive provision.74 This approach accords with the
majority view of states in which the matter is not regulated by con-
stitutional provision.7  Although Washington's adoption of the per-
missive provision is thus intelligible, its adherence for thirty years to
a mandatory provision would seem to require as a matter of fairness
an extension of the new dissenters' rights clause to cover those situa-
tions where minority shareholders are disadvantaged as a result of the
statutory change. 6
'o See New Act §§ 39, 60 and 61. The classes may not exceed three in number and
are to be as equal as possible. WASH. REV. CODE § 23.01.320(3)(a) (1958), seems to
permit the articles of incorporation to provide for directors' terms of more than one
year. On the question of whether a classified board would be possible under such a
section in view of the statute providing for mandatory cumulative voting, see Bohan-
non v. Corporation Comm'n, 82 Ariz. 299, 313 P.2d 379 (1957); Humphrys v.
Winous Co., 165 Ohio St. 45, 133 N.E. 2d 780 (1956).
Business planners desiring to use cumulative voting in new corporations to assure
minority interests in directorships should note New Act § 154 permitting the articles
to require a higher shareholder vote for article amendment; New Act § 40 permitting
existing directors to fill vacancies in the board; New Act § 41 relating to director
removal; New Act §§ 38 and 26 relating to possible reductions in the number of
directors; and New Act § 43 relating to creation of an executive committee.
" See Preface to 1950 Revision at p. vi, contained in American Bar Ass'n, Coin-
mittee on Corporate Laws, MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT (1953).
' 1 MODEL Acv ANN. § 31 1 1.
" For a fuller exposition of the pros and cons of mandatory cumulative voting,
see WILLIAMS, CUMULATIVE VOTING, ch. X (1951) ; Sobieski, In Support of Cumnula-
tive Voting, 15 Bus. LAW. 316 (1960); Steadman & Gibson, Should Cumulative
Voting Be Mandatory?-A Debate, 11 Bus. LAw. 9 (1955); Sturdy, Mandatory
Cumulative Voting-An Anachronism, 16 Bus. LAW. 550 (1961) ; Young, The Case
for Cumulative Voting, 1950 Wis. L. REV. 49.
" See Ford, Share Characteristics Under New Corporation Statutes, 23 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 264, 268-69 (1958).
'See 1 MODEL ACT ANN. § 31, 11 4 1 2.01-.03.
"6 See New Act § 82 relating to the situations under the New Act when dissenting
shareholders are entitled to the appraisal right.
A two-thirds vote of shareholders now possessing the cumulative voting privilege
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C. Preemptive Rights
The preemptive right of a shareholder to acquire unissued shares of
his corporation is specifically recognized for the first time in Washing-
ton7" by virtue of the New Act provision that allows the right to be
limited or denied by article provision." Numerous policy questions
and problems for practitioners are inherent in this deceptively simple
provision. Presumably the first question that should be raised is
whether the preemptive right should have been recognized and, if so,
whether corporations should have been permitted to deny the right by
article provision or amendment." The right was first recognized
simply as a mechanical means for preventing directors from issuing
shares unfairly,0 but later analysis made clear that protection of the
shareholder's interest in such circumstances was afforded by the rules
is required to delete the right from the articles (see note 69 sMpra) and thus share-
holders in large corporations will be protected, if they so desire. Under Swanson v.
Perhamn, discussed supra note 10, some Washington corporations may still be using
straight voting. The principal effect of the change would therefore appear to be on
newer, closely-held corporations where the capital structure has been specifically
designed to give a minority shareholder a directorship. These shareholders may, of
course, be protected by a voting agreement in which event no problem exists. Or it
may be that the corporation's original article provisions for cumulative voting will
be interpreted as a contract among the parties which the majority shareholders will
be enjoined from altering without unanimous shareholder approval. Cf. Sensabaugh
v. Polson Plywood Co., 135 Mont. 562, 342 P.2d 1064 (1959).
"The only provision in the old act even remotely connected with preemptive
rights is WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.140(4) (1958), which authorizes the issuance of
share warrants in the event of "a further allotment of shares." Such warrants may,
of course, be issued even though the corporation's shareholders do not have the
preemptive right (see, e.g., BAKER & CARY, CASES ON CORPORATIONS 842-43 (3d unabr.
ed. 1959)) and hence the existence of such a provision offers no necessary implica-
tion as to the existence of the right. See also Frey, Shareholders' Preemptive Rights,
38 YALE L.J. 563, 577 n.30 (1929), where the author indicates that the tenth draft of
the act upon which the old act was modeled contained a provision limiting pre-
emptive rights to voting shares in absence of contrary article provisions and that
the act as finally approved omitted such provision. Other states adopting the same
basic act added specific provisions dealing with preemptive rights. See IDAHO CODL
ANN. § 30-120(6) (1947); Ky. REV. STAT. § 271.035(1) (1962); LA. REV. STAT. § 12:28
(1950).
There appear to be no Washington cases dealing with preemptive rights.
' New Act § 25.
' Under the New Act, a corporation can amend its articles so as to limit or deny
preemptive rights only on the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the shares of each class
entitled thereon as a class and of the total shares entitled to vote thereon. See New
Act § 61(3). A class of shares is entitled to vote as a class on such amendment, even
if it does not otherwise vote, if its preemptive rights would be limited or denied
as a result of the amendment. New Act § 62(9).
The New Act contains no provision (apart from the amendment provision de-
scribed above) relating to waiver of preemptive rights. Both the North Carolina
(N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-56(3) (1965)) and Ohio (OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.15
(Page 1964)) statutes contain specific provisions for securing waivers apart from
amendments to the articles.
"See Drinker, The Preemptive Right of Shareholders to Subscribe to New
Shares, 43 HARv. L. REv. 586, 590-99 (1930); Morawetz, The Preemptive Right of
Shareholders, 42 HARV. L. REv. 186 (1928).
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imposing a fiduciary responsibility upon directors.8 More recently,
the justification for the right has been based on protection of a share-
holder's relative voting power, dividend rights, liquidation share,82 and
right to invest capital favorably.83 But these benefits are not as
significant for shareholders in large, publicly-held corporations" as
they are for shareholders in closely-held corporations.8" Such benefits
as the shareholder in a publicly-held corporation may receive are
often outweighed by the loss in corporate flexibility in financing re-
sulting from the existence of the preemptive right" and the difficulty
in applying the right in the case of corporations with complex capital
structures.8 7 In recognition of these factors, most corporation statutes
currently permit the right to be preserved by article provision,88 but
some divergence of opinion exists as to the precise statutory format for
so doing. The Model Act offers as an alternative to the New Act
provision a section that denies the preemptive right to shareholders
unless the right is specifically provided for in the articles of incorpora-
tion.89 The difference between the two provisions relates to the result
of inaction: under the New Act failure to mention the right will result
'See, e.g., Schwab v. Schwab-Wilson Mach. Corp., 13 Cal. App. 2d 1, 55 P.2d
1268 (1936) ; Note, Importance of Drafting in Protecting Shareholder Against Dilution
of Interest and Comlndsory Reinvestment, 40 CALIF. L. REV. 132, 138-40 (1952).
' See, e.g., BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 209 (1946); LATTIN, CORPORATIONS 425
(1959) ; STEVENS, CORPORATIONS § 111 (1949).
8 See BERLE & WARREN, CASES Ox BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS (CORPORATION S) 335
(1948).
1 LATTIN, CoRvoPRTIoNS 428 (1959); 1 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 3.39, at 120
(1958).
See O'NEAL, op. cit. supra note 84, at 119-21 ("in most closely-held corporations
... preemptive rights should not only be preserved, they should be extended and
strengthened."); Note, Importance of Drafting in Protecting Shareholder Against
Dilution of Interest and Comndsory Reinvestment, 40 CALIF. L. Rm., 132 (1952).
As the title of the last note suggests, protection of a shareholder's interest in a
closely-held corporation does not stop with charter provisions or preemptive rights
but must also include charter provisions preventing any increase in capital stock
or reissuance of shares without the shareholder's consent. See, in addition to sources
cited above, Hyman v. Velsicol Corp., 342 Ill. App. 489, 97 N.E. 2d 122 (App. Ct.
1951); Note, Premptive Rights in Close Corporation, 23 U. CHI. L. Rxv. 697 (1956).
"8 See, e.g., O'NEAL, op. cit. supra note 84, at 118-19; Drinker, supra note 80, at 612.
' See, e.g., Ross Transport, Inc. v. Crothers, 185 Md. 753, 45 A.2d 267, 270-71(1946) ; 1 MODEL Acr ANN. § 24 ff 4; Frey, Sharetwlders" Preemptive Rights, 38 YALE
L.J. 563, 565-68, 573-74 (1929). See also N.Y. Bus. CoRa'. LAw § 622(d) which
authorizes directors of corporations With the preemptive right and complex capital
structures to apportion shares so as to "preserve as far as practicable the relative
unlimited dividend rights and voting rights of the holders" at the time of the
offering.
Some courts have also been concerned as to possible use of the right by "profes-
sional privateers." See General Inv. Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 88 N.J. Eq. 237,
102 Atl. 252 (1917). See also Drinker, supra note 80, at 615 n.72.
' See 1 MODEL AcT ANN. §24 111 2.01-.02.
' Model Act § 24. Four states currently have such provisions: CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 1106; IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-205(i) (1960) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.45 (1952);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit 15, § 2852-611 (1958).
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in its preservation, whereas under the alternate provision of the Model
Act silence will result in denial of the right. It seems probable that far
more closely-held corporations than publicly-held corporations will fail
to mention the right, and hence the New Act provision affords signifi-
cantly greater net benefits than does the Model Act alternative.9"
A second policy question concerning the new provision is whether
an attempt should have been made to define the term "preemptive
rights," or at least to prescribe those situations in which the right will
not apply. One commentator has argued that it would be unwise to
attempt to circumscribe the term by statute because codification would
prevent the balancing of claims of particular shareholder groups
against the interest of all investors in each fact situation and hence
might contribute to inequitable results in some cases.91 Unfortunately,
the cases do not provide a reliable basis for predicting when the right
will be found to exist92 with the result that use of the common law
standard will result in depriving planners of most of the certainty they
would have had under a statutory definition. A number of statutes in
other jurisdictions provide specific exemptions from the preemptive
right for certain transactions in which the shareholders' interest is
likely to be slight.93 These statutes appear to provide a better balance
between the interests concerned than the New Act provision and thus
seem worthy of investigation.
A similar policy question lurks in the omission from the New Act
provision of two parts of the Model Act source provision. The Model
" The alternative provision would also result in eliminating the preemptive
rights of shareholders in corporations the articles of which do not specifically men-
tion the preemptive right. Such corporations again seem likely to be primarily
closely-held corporations and hence any deprivation would seem unwise.
See STEVENS, CORPORATIONS § 111, at 514 (1949).
Lattin defines the general test for the existence of a preemptive right as
"whether the proportionate rights of the present shareholders as to voting, dividends,
or corporate assets are, or may be, cut down by the new issue." LATrIN, CORPORATIONS
426 (1959). The courts, however, have gone on to allow a number of exceptions to the
rule on grounds of supposed or actual necessity. For example, exceptions have been
recognized in the past for shares issued for property (Thom v. Baltimore Trust Co.,
158 Md. 352, 148 AtI. 234 (1930)), in connection with a merger (Musson v. New
York & Queens Elec. Light & Power Co., 138 Misc. 881, 247 N.Y.S. 406 (Sup. Ct
1931)), and in payment of a debt (Dunlay v. Avenue M Garage & Repair Co., 253
N.Y. 274, 170 N.E. 917 (1930)). But as the courts have come to recognize that the
"right" should only be a "privilege," and consequently that a balancing process should
be applied, the rigidity of the old exceptions has broken down. See, e.g., Fuller v.
Krogh, 15 Wis. 2d 412, 113 N.W.2d 25 (1962), where the court held that the preemp-
tive right would apply to shares to be issued for property unless the corporation was
in great need for such property. And as the exceptions have broken down, so has
the planner's certainty.
" See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 33-343 (1960) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1831.1
(1948); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 30-120(6), (7) (1948); MD. CODE ANN. art. 23, § 30
(1957); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 622(e); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-56(c) (1965); VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-23 (1964).
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Act specifically provides that preemptive rights would apply to trea-
sury shares as well as unissued shares.94 The omission of treasury
shares from the New Act provision would leave the applicability of
preemptive rights to treasury shares a matter of common law, with the
result that they ordinarily would not be subject to the right.9" It has
been recognized, however, that at least in closely-held corporations,
the preemptive right should in most cases apply to treasury sharesY
Given the general operation of the New Act provision, it appears that
it would have been better to have made treasury shares subject to the
preemptive right, unless the articles provide otherwise, so that share-
holders in corporations with hastily-drawn articles would be protected.
The Model Act provision also provides that a corporation can sell
its shares to its officers or employees, free of shareholder preemptive
rights, if the terms of the sale had been approved by the vote of a
majority of all shares entitled to vote thereon. 7  This provision is
important in two respects: first, it clarifies the question as to whether
the preemptive right applies to such shares;" and second, it requires
that the shareholders approve share transactions made with officers and
employees.99 Under the New Act provision, if preemptive rights are
denied by article provision or amendment, then the board of directors
" Model Act § 24. New Act §3(8) (identical with Model Act § 2 (h)) defines
treasury shares as shares of a corporation which have been issued, have been sub-
sequently acquired by the corporation, and have not been restored to the status of
authorized but unissued shares. Treasury shares are deemed to be "issued" shares
but not "outstanding" shares.
See 11 FLETcHER, PRIvATE CoRPORATIoNs § 5136.2 (1958 rev. vol.). The cases
seem to draw a rather sharp line between treasury shares-repurchased but not retired
-and shares repurchased and retired. See Dunn v. Acme Auto & Garage Co., 168
Wis. 128, 169 N.W. 297 (1918). See also 36 YALE L.J. 1181 (1927), for arguments
in support of placing treasury shares within the right.
" See O'NAL, op. cit. supra note 84, at 119, 120.
' Model Act § 24 ff 2. Another significant omission by the New Act in this area
is optional section 18A of the Model Act. That provision authorizes corporations
to create and issue rights and options to purchase shares, whether or not in connec-
tion with the issue and sale of any of its shares or other securities. If such rights
or options were issued to directors, officers, or employees, their issuance is subject
to approval by a majority of the outstanding shares entitled to vote thereon. Under
the New Act, as a result of this omission, directors can grant such options without
shareholder approval.
"s Presumably these shares would fall under the general exception to the preemptive
privilege for share issuances for services. See, e.g., Milwaukee Sanitarium v. Swift,
238 Wis. 628, 300 N.W. 760 (1941) (alternative holding). But see Hyman v. Behar,
39 Misc. 2d 617, 241 N.Y.S.2d 625 (Sup. Ct. 1963) holding that shares to be issued
to employees for past services were not within the New York statutory exception
for shares issued other than for cash.
' See in this regard Emerson, The New Ohio General Corporation Law: Sonie
Comments and Some Comparisons, 24 U. CINc. L. REv. 463, 475 (1955). The problem
Professor Emerson notes is magnified by the omission from the New Act of Model
Act optional § 18A. See note 97 supra.
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has final authority with respect to share sales to officers,100 absent an
article provision to the contrary.' 0 ' Recent changes in the Internal
Revenue Code may cause more stock transactions with employees to be
put to a vote of the shareholders,' 0 2 and gross abuse can be contained
through the general fiduciary principle that directors and officers may
not use their positions for their own personal advantage. 0 3 Because
these protections are not as effective as the original Model Act proposal,
that provision ought to be added to the New Act provision.
A final problem under the New Act provision is determining pre-
cisely how it affects existing corporations. It is clear that where a
corporation's articles specifically provide for preemptive rights, these
rights generally should not be affected by the New Act provision. 0 4
This result should also obtain where the corporation's articles are
silent with respect to the privilege because shareholders presumably
had the privilege as a matter of common law before the adoption of
the act" 5 and certainly have the privilege under the New Act. Where
the corporation's articles originally denied or limited the privilege or
where the articles were amended to deny or limit the privilege, the
shareholder's rights after the adoption of the New Act seem to depend
upon the effect of the limitations in the absence of specific statutory
authorization and upon the effect of the adoption of the new provision.
"See New Act § 5(16) which provides the corporation shall have the power
to establish stock option plans for any and all of its directors, officers and employee§.
Directors, by virtue of their power to manage the business and affairs of the corpora-
tion, are the sole repository of such power. See New Act § 37.
"' Such a provision would be permissible under New Act § 55(10) which allows
the incorporators to set forth in the articles of incorporation provisions regulating
internal affairs of the corporation.
1"2INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 422(b) (1), provides that in order for a stock option
to be "qualified" (with resultant benefits of long-term capital gain on eventual sale
of the stock if the holding period is met) the option must be granted pursuant to a
plan which includes the aggregate number of shares which may be issued unddr
options and the class of employees eligible to receive the options. The plan must be
approved by "the stockholders of the granting corporation" within 12 months before
or after the date the plan is adopted.
103 See, e.g., Schwab v. Schwab-Wilson Mach. Corp., 13 Cal. App. 2d 1, 55 P.2d
1268 (1936).
An additional indirect control measure is the proxy rules under § 14 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, since options granted to directors and certain officers must be
disclosed. The coverage of such rules has recently been significantly expanded and
presumably now cover many of the companies using stock-option plans. See 1964
Amendments, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 312(g).
"' A possible exception to this statement may be the situation where the corpora-
tion's articles do not afford the preemptive right to as many shareholders as would
get the right under the new act provision. In this event, the article provision acts
as a limitation on the shareholder's preemptive rights and thus would be subject to
the analysis in text following note 105 infra.
There seems to be little doubt that corporate charter provisions specifically recog-
nizing preemptive rights will be sustained even though statutory support can not
be found for them. See Real-Estate Trust Co. v. Bird, 90 Md. 229, 44 Atl. 1048 (1899).
"' See, e.g., BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 209 (1946).
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Although no case has considered the effect of an original article limita-
tion in these circumstances, there seems no valid reason why the origi-
nal shareholders could not impose a limitation on preemptive rights
under statutory language permitting stock to be issued subject to such
limitations as are stated in the articles.'0 6 This conclusion is to some
extent supported by the cases considering the effects of article amend-
ments in such circumstances; once the difficulties with respect to the
doctrine of vested rights have been surmounted, 10 7 the courts have
permitted such amendments.0 8 Even if a pre-New Act article pro-
vision or amendment denying the preemptive rights is valid, however,
it still may be argued that the effect of the adoption of the New Act is
to provide shareholders with the preemptive right as of the effective
date of the act and that a subsequent amendment to the articles is
necessary to deprive shareholders of the right. But this argument
should be ignored because it presses an implication in the New Act
provision to the point of producing results directly contrary to its
apparent purpose of giving specific recognition to article provisions
limiting the preemptive right.
D. Redeemable Shares
The New Act explicitly authorizes 0 9 (as did the old act by clear
100 See WAsH. REv. CODE § 23.01.130(1) (1961). See also Morawetz, 7he Preemp-
tive Right of Shareholders, 42 HARv. L. REv. 186, 196 (1928) ("a shareholder has no
preemptive right if the existence of such a right is negatived.., by its articles of
association or by a valid bylaw adopted by the shareholders....") Compare, however,
the statement by Drinker, supra note 80, at 587 n.3: "It is, of course, recognized that
in view of the firm footing which the preemptive right has obtained in the decisions,
its abolition could be effected only by statute or by proper provisions in the articles
of association authorized by statute." In view of the more recent analysis as to the
importance of the preemptive right, it seems likely that modern courts would be
much more receptive to an article provision even in the absence of statute than
Drinker suggests.
The conclusion in text would also seem supported by express recognition that a
limitation may be placed upon the voting power of shares since some have concluded
that preservation of relative voting power lies at the heart of the preemptive privi-
lege. See Drinker, supra note 80, at 589.
I" See in this respect Albrecht, Maguire & Co. v. General Plastics, Inc., 256 App.
Div. 134, 9 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1939), aff'd without opinion, 280 N.Y. 840, 21 N.E.2d 887
(1939), requiring specific statutory authority for such an amendment. This approach
was used by some courts as a means of protecting vested rights. See Gibson, The
Virginia Corporation Law of 1956,42 VA. L. REv. 603, 605-08 (1956).
' The case closest to the current statutory situation in Washington is Milwaukee
Sanitarium v. Swift, 238 Wis. 628, 300 N.W. 760 (1941). There the statute permitted
the articles to be amended so as to include all provisions that could have been placed
in the original articles of incorporation. The court without any discussion of the
validity of an article provision denying such rights approved an amendment with
this effect. See also Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., 32 Del. Ch. 231, 83 A2d
595 (Ch. 1951), aff'd, 33 Del. CIL 82, 90 A.2d 660 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (statutory language
considerably different from the Washington statute); and Mobile Press Register,
Inc. v. McGowin, 271 Ala. 414, 124 So. 2d 812 (1960) (same).
"'oNew Act § 15(1) authorizes creation and issuance of redeemable shares of
[VOL. 41 :207
WASHINGTON BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT
implication)" ° creation of redeemable preferred shares. Both acts
also seem to permit creation of two types of redeemable shares over
which there is much controversy: (1) shares that are redeemable at
the option of the shareholder; and (2) redeemable common shares."'
Shares redeemable at the shareholders' option may be useful in plan-
"preferred or special classes." If so authorized by the articles, the directors may
determine the terms and conditions upon which a series of preferred may be redeemed,
and hence, whether it can be redeemed at all. New Act § 16(1) and (2). As to when
shares may be redeemed and treatment of redeemed shares, see text infra Part II
under the heading "Share Redemptions and Purchases."
On the general subject of redeemable stock, see Jones, Redeemable Corporate
Securities, 5 So. CALF. L. REv. 83 (1931); Dodd, Purchase and Redemption by a
Corporation of Its Own Shares: The Substantive Law, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 697 (1941).
"'See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 23.01.130(1), 23.01.440 (1958) ; Matteson v. Ziebarth,
40 Wn. 2d 286, 242 P.2d 1025 (1952) (by implication); Hay v. Big Bend Land Co.,
32 Wn. 2d 887, 204 P.2d 488 (1949) (by implication).
I Under the New Act, the question of whether a corporation may create share-
holder-option shares and redeemable common shares depends on the construction
placed upon the following portion of New Act § 15 1 2 as it relates to New Act §
15111:
Without limiting the authority herein contained, a corporation, when so pro-
vided in its articles of incorporation may issue shares of preferred or special
classes: (1) Subject to the right of the corporation to redeem any of such
shares at the price fixed by the articles of incorporation for the redemption
thereof.
Plain meaning construction of the first clause in this quoted portion indicates that
the material appearing in New Act § 15 1 2(1) is not a limitation but simply an
attempt to make clear that certain rights may be granted. But the Illinois Supreme
Court in Bowman v. Armour & Co., 17 Ill. 2d 43, 160 N.E.2d 753 (1959), a rather
difficult recapitalization case, ignored the first clause entirely and read the material
in a statute identical to New Act § 15 ff 2(1) as a limitation on a statute identical
to New Act § 15 1. The Bowntw interpretation of the language in New Act § 15 1 2
should not be followed because it seems to be "bad law as a result of a hard case"
rather than a defensible construction. If the lead-in clause in New Act § 15 12 is
properly interpreted, and the broad provisions of New Act § 15 1 1 govern the
corporation's authority to create shareholder-option shares and redeemable common
shares, then the corporation should have such authority for New Act § 15 f11 imposes
no limitations on the creation of such shares. Moreover, on shareholder-option
shares, see the draftsmen's comment to the provision restricting redemptions in the
event of insolvency (New Act § 68) which specifically recognizes the possibility of
an option in the shareholder. 2 MODEL AcT ANN. § 60 1 4. Further, with respect to
redeemable (or more correctly, callable) common shares, even if the language in New
Act § 15 ff 2 is read as a limitation, the court in Lewis v. H. P. Hood & Sons, 331
Mass. 670, 121 N.E.2d 850 (1954), interpreted the term "preferred or special classes"
to permit redeemable common stock. But see Starring v. American Hair & Felt Co.,
21 Del. Ch. 380, 191 Atl. 887 (Ch.), aff'd on opinion below, 21 Del. Ch. 431, 2 A.2d
249 (Sup. Ct. 1937), where the court concluded that a Deleware statute authorizing
redemption of preferred shares should be interpreted to prohibit by implication
redemption of common shares.
Under the old act, there is again a broad grant of authority with respect to types
of shares that may be issued and it would appear that both types of redeemable
shares could be issued under this broad authority. See WASH. REV. CODE § 23.01.130
(1) (1958). However, the reference in WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.440 (1958) to redemp-
tion of preferred shares is similar to the Delaware statute interpreted by the court
in Starring and perhaps the Washington court might read the provision as a limita-
tion upon the general grant of WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.130 (1958), as the Starring
court did. Starring was argued to the Washington court in In the Matter of the West
Waterway Lumber Co., 59 Wn. 2d 310, 367 P.2d 807 (1962). The court concluded that
the by-law before it was not a redemption clause but rather a repurchase agreement,
and bypassed Starring's applicability in Washington.
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ning for deadlocks in closely-held corporations.12 But several states" 3
have prohibited issuance of shareholder option shares because of the
possibility of injury to the corporation and its creditors as a result of
compulsory redemption in a time of corporate need." 4 Proponents of
such shares answer that the New Act provision prohibiting redemptions
that will cause insolvency offers sufficient protection to creditors"' and
that, in any event, management can protect itself against untimely
redemptions by article limitations on the shareholder's right."0 The
defect in this argument is that shareholders can acquire the same
benefits by virtue of stock repurchase agreements"' which, at the same
time, provide more statutory protection for creditors."" Creditors in a
faltering enterprise may find the insolvency limitation--i.e., that after
the redemption the corporation must be able to pay its debts as they
become due" 0-- small comfort and their interest may not be protected
by article limitations adopted by the shareholders. Thus, the New Act
provision should be amended to make clear that only corporations are
permitted to have the option to redeem. 20
The two leading cases considering whether callable common shares
were permissible under particular corporate statutes reached opposite
"' See Note, Stock Redemption at the Option of the Shareholder in the Close
Corporation, 48 Iowa L. Rev. 986, 1000-04 (1963); 2 0'NE ., CLOSE CORPRTIONS
§ 9.05 (1958).
"See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1011; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-40 (Supp. 1955) ; and
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 512(a).
"U See LAT-IN, CORPORATIONS 443 (1959) ; Dodd, Purchase and Redemption By A
Corporation of Its Own Shares: The Substantive Law, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 697, 730-31
(1941); and Jones, Redeemable Corporate Securities, 5 So. CALIF. L. REv. 83, 100
(1931). An additional argument against such shares is that such an option is more
typical in "creditor" securities rather than "ownership" instruments and therefore
should be more accurately labelled as credit instruments. See de Capriles & Mc-
Aniff, The Financial Provisions of the New (1961) New York Business Corporation
Law, 36 N.Y.U. L. Rzv. 1239, 1245 (1961).
"'Note, 48 IowA L. REV. 986, 1005 (1963) ; see New Act § 68.
Ford, Share Characteristics Under 77e New Corporation Statutes, 23 LAW &
CONTEiP. PROB. 264, 280-81 (1958).
" See 2 'NEAL, CLOSE CORORATIONS § 9.05 (1958).
11 Shares may be repurchased under the New Act only to the extent of unrestricted
earned surplus and only when the purchase will not render the corporation insolvent.
New Act § 6. As to when shares are repurchasable, and when redeemable, see In the
Matter of West Waterway Lumber Co., 59 Wn. 2d 310, 367 P.2d 807 (1962) and text
infra Part II under the heading "Share Redemptions and Purchases."
" The New Act adopts the equitable definition of insolvency. See New Act §
3(14).
" It can be argued that this provision gives the creditors more protection in
the event of a shareholder option than they receive when the corporation has the
option since corporate redemptions are permitted from stated capital whereas re-
purchases must be made from earned surplus. But managerial negligence in redeem-
ing stock in times of financial difficulty can be more readily ascertained than possible
negligence in giving shareholders an unlimited option to redeem. And all the
argument really says is that the limitations on redemptions ought to be re-examined.
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conclusions. In Starring v. American Hair & Felt Co.,1"1 the court held
that a Delaware statute authorizing redemption of preferred or special
shares prohibited by implication redemption of common shares. In
contrast, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Lewis v. H. P. Hood
& Sons,122 construed statutory language authorizing creation of "two or
more classes of stock with such preferences, voting powers, restrictions
and qualifications" as provided in the articles, as permitting creation
of callable common shares. In Lewis, the plaintiff argued that such
stock was contrary to the general policy of Massachusetts corporation
statutes because it placed shareholders under the domination of direc-
tors. The court held that this argument went to the possibility of
abuse of power, rather than to the question of whether the power
existed, and that abuses of the power would, of course, not be per-
mitted. It was also held that such a provision was not incompatible
with the inherent nature of common stock.
Callable common shares may be useful in restricting ownership in a
closely-held corporation, in connection with an employee stock option
plan, or in a small growth corporation as a compromise between in-
vestor desires to participate in the growth and management wishes to
secure ultimate complete ownership of the corporation. 3  Against
these advantages must be weighed not only the danger of director
domination of shareholders noted in Lewis' 24 but also the increased
possibility of injury to creditors resulting from the fact that common
shares could thus be redeemed from stated capital whereas otherwise
they could only be acquired from earned surplus.' 2' The current New
York statute resolves these conflicting interests by permitting re-
deemable common shares to be issued only if the corporation has
outstanding a class of common shares that is not subject to redemp-
tion. 126 A similiar provision would appear to be a valuable addition to
the New Act.
"121 Del. Ch. 380, 191 At. 887 (Ch.), aff'd on opinion below, 21 Del. Ch. 431,
2 A.2d 249 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
'=331 Mass. 670, 121 N.E.2d 850 (1954).
See Note, Callable Common Stock, 68 HARv. L. REv. 1240-41 (1955) ; see also
LArrIN, CORPORATIONS 443 (1959).
"u For a discussion of this problem, see Note, Callable Common Stock, 68 HARV.
L. REv. at 1244-46 (1955).
": See New Act § 6. To some extent, this possibility of greater injury is illusory
for if shares repurchased are retired, apparently no permanent reduction of earned
surplus occurs under the New Act (see text infra Part II under "Share Redemptions
and Purchases") and the purchase is in essence from stated capital. But the creditor
would at least be protected to the extent of the earned surplus that must be present
before the purchase can be made; this surplus need not be present in case of a redemp-
tion.
" N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW § 512 (a), (c).
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One other addition to the New Act that might be considered is a set
of detailed procedures which would govern the redemption only in the
event that the articles or other creative instrument are ambiguous or
incomplete. Other states127 have similar provisions and they appear
useful as guidelines for the draftsman.
E. Convertible Shares
The New Act explicitly,'28 and the old act implicitly, 29 authorize
corporations to create and issue shares convertible into shares of any
other class. As a protection to senior classes, the New Act further
provides that shares may not be made convertible into shares of a class
with preferences as to assets on liquidation or dividends prior to those
of the shares to be issued, and that shares without par value shall not
be converted into shares with par value unless the stated capital
allocable to the convertible shares is at the time of conversion at least
equal to the aggregate par value of the shares into which they are
convertible. 3 ° The prohibition against "upstream conversions" is a
common provision' 3' designed to prevent creation of shares which
would allow holders to move into the superior position in times of
adversity at the expense of other shareholders or creditors.
32
The purpose and operation of the stated capital provision are a bit
more puzzling. It is clear that the consideration requirement of par
value for par shares requires that an amount equal to the par value of
the resulting shares must be transferred to stated capital of the par
shares at the time of conversion. 13 3 But the present provision does not
See, e.g., CALIF. CORP. CODE §§ 1700-1703.
'New Act § 15(5). On the general subject of convertible securities, see Hills
Convertible Securities-Legal Aspects and Draftsnzanship, 19 CALIF. L. REv. 1
(1939) ; Berle, Convertible Bonds and Stock Purchase Warrants, 36 YALE L.J. 649
(1927).
'WAsH. REv. CODE §§ 23.01.030(1)(e), and 23.01.130(1) (1958), both permit
issuance of shares with the "rights" provided in the articles of incorporation. More
particularly, see Larsen v. The Lilly Estate, 34 Wn. 2d 39, 208 P.2d 150 (1949),
upholding the conversion of preferred shares into common stock.
1New Act § 15(5).
If the articles of incorporation so provide, the board of directors may fix the
terms on which a particular series of a class of shares can be converted. See New
Act § 16(1) and (2).
IAll the states adopting the Model Act or considering its provisions in con-
nection with a corporate statute revision appear to have adopted it. See 1 MODEL
ACT ANN. § 14.
ISee in this connection In re Phoenix Hotel Corp., 83 F.2d 724 (6th Cir. 1936),
which involved a Kentucky statute that authorized the issue of preferred stock
convertible into bonds. Preferred shares with such privilege were issued. Several
years later the shares were converted into bonds. The issue concerned the rights of
creditors who had extended credit before the conversion. The court held that the
bonds were not entitled to priority over the creditors existing at the time of
conversion.
" New Act § 18 5.
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guarantee that the stated capital allocable to the no-par convertible
shares will equal this amount at the outset nor does it guarantee that
the corporation will have sufficient surplus.. capable of transfer to the
par shares' stated capital so as to make up the difference. To prevent
conversions from being blocked by lack of surplus at the time of con-
version or by director recalcitrance,' this provision should be
amended to require either creation of a surplus reserve 36 or capitaliza-
tion of the required amount3 7 before the convertible shares can be
issued. Absent a corrective amendment, draftsmen of convertible
instruments must carefully cover the problem. 38
Several other matters concerning convertible shares should be con-
sidered as possible amendment topics or as problems for draftsmen.
For example, the New Act does not require that a corporation issuing
convertible shares must provide for and retain sufficient unissued
shares of appropriate classes to satisfy the conversion privilege of all
of its issued convertible shares.'39 It does not provide an answer to the
' New Act § 18 permits use of any type of surplus for this purpose. The provision
also, inexplicably, does not cover convertible shares with a par value less than the par
value of the resultant shares, which convertible shares present the same problems as
no-par shares.
See Manne, Accounting For Share Issues Under Modern Corporation Laws,
54 Nw. U.L. REv. 285, 307 (1959). It seems reasonably clear that refusal of the
directors to transfer available surplus to stated capital could be overcome by court
action. Moreover, if surplus is lacking for such a transfer conceivably the directors
might be liable on previous distributions to this extent. See New Act § 48(1)
imposing liability on directors for any dividend "contrary to the provisions of this
act" and see Marony v. Wheeling & L. E. Ry., 33 F.2d 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
"See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE §§ 1701.21, 1701.22 (Page 1964), for provisions
requiring creation of such a reserve before issuance of convertible shares.
The amount of the reserve presumably should be determined after deducting any
consideration to be received upon conversion of the convertible shares. The possibil-
ity of such additional consideration has been ignored in New Act § 15(5).
,, See, e.g., N.Y. SToCn CoRP. LAW § 27(1). Compare the approach in the current
New York law, N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 519(e) which would prohibit issuance of
the convertible shares unless the consideration received therefor was in excess of
par value of resulting shares.
Manne, supra note 135, at 306-07, argues that the Model Act approach, i.e., giving
no accounting significance to the resulting shares at the time of the issuance of the
convertible shares, is more rational than either the Ohio or the New York approaches.
He argues that there is no reason to disturb surplus for this purpose in view of the
possibility that the convertible shares may never be converted. This point may
lead one to conclude that the Ohio approach offers the best compromise since it not
only would allow conversion but also would permit free use of the surplus on
expiration of the conversion privilege. But it does not compel acceptance of the
Model Act approach which would permit free use of the surplus at the expense of
possible performance on the corporation's obligations. Cf. Marony v. Wheeling &
L. E. Ry., 33 F.2d 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
' See in this connection New Act § 72 dealing with the creation of reserves from
earned surplus by action of the board of directors. Such reserves reduce the corpora-
tion's dividend-paying capacity. See New Act § 45 (1).
"'In Marony v. Wheeling & L. E. Ry., 33 F.2d 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1929) it was held
that a corporation with convertible shares outstanding must be ready to issue the
resulting shares and meet the demands of holders to exercise their options.
New York currently gives corporations the option either to reserve enough un-
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question of whether the preemptive right applies to convertible shares
where the resulting shares are subject to the right. 4° Nor does the
New Act limit the exercise of the conversion feature to the share-
holder; hence the corporation may be able to obtain what is in effect a
disguised right of redemption. 4' Finally, the New Act does not make
specific provision for including in the terms of convertible securities
appropriate anti-dilution provisions and thus misses a chance to spot-
light a crucial convertible share problem.
42
F. Debt Instruments
Both acts imply that boards of directors have the sole authority to
incur corporate liabilities, to issue corporate notes, bonds and other
obligations, and to secure any corporate obligation by mortgage or
pledge of corporate property or income.143 Although neither act makes
issued shares to satisfy conversion privileges in debt instruments (but inexplicably,
not in shares) or to authorize the directors by an article provision to file amendments
increasing the number of authorized shares up to a specified limit to satisfy conver-
sion privileges. N. Y. Bus. CoRn'. LAW § 519(d) (2).
The Washington Court has held that shares issued to satisfy the conversion privi-
lege do not constitute an overissue if the exchange is made without change in
authorized capital. See Larsen v. The Lilly Estate, 34 Wn. 2d 39, 44, 208 P.2d 150,
(1949). Nevertheless, it would seem desirable to settle the point by statute or share
provision since the privilege afforded in Larsen may well be limited to its specific
fact situation.
... See discussion at text accompanying note 90 supra, as to the New Act's lack
of definition of preemptive rights.
The cases concerning the applicability of the right to convertible securities or
shares are inconsistent. Compare Wall v. Utah Copper Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 17, 62 AtI. 533
(1905), with Todd v. Maryland Casualty Co., 155 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1946). A number
of states have dealt with the problem by specific statutory provision. See, e.g., N. Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 622 (e) (3) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-44, 55-56 (1965) ; OHIO REV.
CODE ANzN. § 1701.15 (Page 1964).
"4 See Elias v. Clarke, 143 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 778 (1944)
which held that conversion at the option of the corporation is a form of redemption
and use of the convertible label to describe such shares is misleading. The current
New York Act specifically allows only shareholders to have the option to convert.
N. Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 519(a).
112 For drafting assistance on such provisions, see Kaplan, Piercing the Corporate
Boilerplate: Anti-Dilution Clauses in Ccnvertile Securities, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 1
(1965) ; and Irvine, Some Comments Regarding "Anti-dilutiol" Provisions Appli-
cable to Convertible Securities, 13 Bus. LAW. 729 (1958).
"Under New Act § 5 (8), corporations are empowered to do the acts stated above,
and under New Act § 37, the board of directors has the power to manage the business
and affairs of the corporation. See also New Act § 80 which specifically provides
that mortgages and pledges of corporate property can be authorized solely by board
of director action.
Under the old act, corporate power to incur debts was implied as a necessary inci-
dent to a corporation's general powers (see WASH. REV. CODE § 23.01.110(1) (1958),
and 1 P-H CORP. SERv. ff 2201 (1964) and cases cited therein) and the directors again
had the power to manage the corporation's business. See WASH. REv. CODE §
23.01.320(1) (1958). The old act also did not require shareholder approval of mort-
gages unless the articles so stated. See WASH. REV. CODE § 23.01.110(2) (d) (1958).
New Act § 5 (8) also authorizes corporations to make guarantees. Compare VAsH.
REv. CODE § 23.01.120(1) (1958), which authorizes corporations to guarantee "shares,
bonds, securities and other evidences of indebtedness of any domestic or foreign
corporation!'
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any reference to the type or quantity of consideration necessary to
support debt increases, director discretion in this respect is regulated
by the Washington Constitution provision requiring that corporate
obligations be incurred only in exchange for money or property re-
ceived or labor done and proscribing fictitious increases in indebted-
ness. "'44 The latter proscription obviously demands determination of
value of the consideration where property or services are received but
the constitution is silent as to how the determination is to be made
and when it can be challenged."' To clarify the point, consideration
and valuation provisions for debt increases,40 presumably similar to
the provisions governing stock issuances,"4 7 should be added to the
New Act.
A second important question that is not solved by either act is
whether, or in what circumstances, a board of directors has the sole
authority to issue debt securities convertible into shares. Both acts
appear to give directors this authority at least in the situation where
the corporation has on hand sufficient authorized but unissued shares,
and neither preemptive rights nor an article restriction is involved. 4
But can directors merely by resolution issue convertible debt instru-
ments where sufficient unauthorized shares are unavailable or where
the resulting shares have the preemptive right? Because of the
popularity of convertible debt instruments," 9 the New Act should be
" WAsH. CONsT. art. 12, § 6.
"' The cases interpreting this part of article 12, § 6 have involved such gross
violations of the provision that the Washington court has not had to face the ques-
tion of valuation. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Turner, 174 Wash. 266, 24 P.2d 641 (1933);
Jorguson v. Apex Gold Mines Co., 74 Wash. 243, 133 Pac. 465 (1913).
':See, e.g., N. Y. Bus. Coi,. LAW § 518(a).
' See text discussion infra, beginning note 206, concerning the provisions regulating
stock issuances.
It may be argued that enacting a provision making the directors' determination of
value conclusive in the absence of fraud derogates the constitutional proscription on
fictitious increases. These provisions, however, are common in corporation statutes
regulating stock issuance (see, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 23.01.170 (1958)) despite
similar governing constitutional language (see, e.g., WASH. CONsT. art. 12, § 6) and
thus far have not been challenged on this ground.
"' Under these facts, the directors would have sole authority to issue either non-
convertible debt instruments or shares separately and hence should have the authority
to issue an instrument combining the two. Two recent statutes specifically give the
directors sole authority in such circumstances. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-44 (1965); N.Y.
Bus. CoRP. LAW § 519(d). The New York provision goes on to permit directors to
issue convertible debt securities where the shareholders have authorized the directors
to amend the articles to authorize a sufficient number of shares.
In connection with possible applications of preemptive rights to this situation, see
note 140 supra.
' The popularity of convertible debt securities stems primarily from their asso-
ciated tax advantages. These securities afford the holder a fixed income and creditor
status until conversion. If the resulting share price increases, the holder can generally
realize a capital gain upon sale of either the debt instrument or resulting shares. The
corporation before conversion is entitled to an interest deduction for federal income
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amended to provide clear guidelines as to when such instruments may
be issued and what restrictions, if any, are to be placed upon such
issuances."' °
Another possible addition to the New Act is suggested by the re-
cently adopted New York provision'51 that permits a corporation to
confer upon bondholders any of the rights possessed by shareholders.
Such a provision strengthens a lender's position primarily by enabling
him to vote directly on matters requiring shareholder approval 2
without the necessity of an intervening proxy and possible questions
as to the sufficiency of his interest to support the proxy. 3 A number
of states have adopted similiar provisions with a view to providing
corporations with maximum flexibility in financing,' and hence such a
provision may be worthy of consideration in Washington.)
IH. REGULATION OF CORPORATE CAPITAL
The most important and, unfortunately, the most complex changes
wrought by the New Act occur in the provisions regulating legal
tax purposes. The corporation also benefits because generally the interest rate will be
lower because of the conversion feature. Its shareholders also benefit because earnings
per share are not diluted until conversion at which time the corporation's earnings
may well have been increased by earnings from the capital acquired by the debt issu-
ance. See, e.g., 1 DEwiNG, FINANcIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 268-70 (5th ed. 1953) ;
Fleischer & Cary, The Taxation of Convertible Bonds and Stock, 74 HAgv. L. REv.
473-76 (1961).
1IHills, Model Corporation Act, 48 HIAv. L. REv. 1334, 1354 n.37 (1935) argued
that shareholder approval should always be required before convertible debt instru-
ments could be issued because of the possible dilution of their interest on conversion.
This problem seems to be an aspect of the pre-emptive right question inherent in the
issuance of the securities, and the question should be resolved in any statutory re-
vision. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-44 (1965), which requires shareholder approval
sufficient to waive the pre-emptive privilege if the resulting class of shares has the
privilege.
See also the discussion of convertible shares in text accompanying note 139 supra
for other possible restrictions on issuance of such debt instruments.
IN. Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 518(c).
" The debt-holders can by contract acquire the right to block a specific organic
change that a particular percentage of them do not approve. See 2 HERwivz, CASEs &
MATERIALS ON BUSINESS PLANNING 214 (temp. ed. 1964). But in absence of a specific
statutory authorization, it seems doubtful that they can vote directly in the election
of directors or in place of the shareholders on other matters requiring shareholder
approval. See New Act § 15, implying that voting rights are an attribute of stock;
6A FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, § 2769 (1950); and Tracy, The Problem of
Granting Voting Rights to Bondholders, 2 U. CHI. L. REv. 208, 212 (1934).
" The lenders' interest in the enterprise generally would be sufficient to support
a proxy coupled with an interest. See, e.g., State ex rel. Everett Trust & Says. Bank v.
Pacific Waxed Paper Co., 22 Wn. 2d 844, 157 P2d 707 (1945) ; Note, The Irrevocable
Proxy and Voting Control of Sinall Business Corporations, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 401,
408-12 (1950) ; N. Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 609 (f) (3).
' CAL. CoRP. CODE § 306; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 221 (1953) ; MD. ANN. CODE
art. 237, § 18(a) (8) (1957) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-317 (1958).
' For a discussion of various problems that may arise under such a provision,
see generally Tracy, supra note 152.
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capital. A brief historical survey seems necessary before undertaking
a detailed comparison.
The prime characteristic of corporations is a limitation of share-
holder liability for corporate debts to the amount of the shareholder's
original investment. Although this characteristic pre-dated the Ameri-
can Revolution,..6 the law at that time provided no safeguards for the
corporation's creditors beyond those that were provided for the pro-
tection of creditors of individuals. Corporations at this time were
accustomed to issue shares for any amount of consideration that they
pleased. No distinction was made between capital and surplus with
the result that dividends were repeatedly paid out of capital. 5 ' Credi-
tors of corporations were seriously disadvantaged under these rules
because of their inability to call for new capital contributions in the
event that the capital remaining after distributions to shareholders was
not sufficient to cover corporate debts. Protection for corporate credi-
tors was first generally announced in the celebrated case of Wood v.
Dumner58 where Judge Story stated:
[T]he capital stock of banks is to be deemed a pledge or a trust fund for
the payment of the debts contracted by the bank. The public, as well as
the legislature, has always supposed this to be a fund appropriated for
such purposes.... The charter relieves [the shareholders] from personal
responsibility, and substitutes the capital stock in its stead. Credit is
universally given to this fund by the public, as the only means of re-
payment. During the existence of the corporation, it is the sole property
of the corporation, and can be applied only according to its charter,
that is, a fund for a payment of its debts .... 159
Shorn of its trust fund connotations, 6 this language establishes the
concept of legal, or stated, capital which lies at the heart of the pro-
visions in both the old and new acts regulating corporate finance.
Those provisions may be arbitrarily divided into rules regulating the
obligation of the shareholder to pay for shares obtained from the
corporation and rules regulating the distribution of corporate assets
to the shareholders.
The thought that creditors relied upon the amount of "capital stock"
" See Salmon v. Hamborough Co., Cas. in Ch., Pt. I, 204 (1670); Naylor v.
Brown, Finch Ch. 83, 84 (1673) ; 8 HoLDSWO rH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 203 (2d
ed. 1937) ; Warren, Safeguarding the Creditors of Corporations, 36 HAIv. L. REv. 509,
521 (1923).
" Warren, supra note 156, at 522.
" 30 Fed. Cas. 435 (No. 17944) (C.C.D. Me., 1824).
d. at 436.
") For a critical analysis of the trust fund doctrine, see Warren, supra note 156, at
544-47; Gose, Legal Significance of "Capital Stock", 32 WAsH. L. Rav. 1, 5-9 (1957).
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in a corporation in advancing credit made it imperative to assure that
the aggregate par value of shares outstanding was a true indicator of
the actual value of the consideration received therefor. 61  Hence,
shareholders were early required by statute, 6 ' and are still required by
both acts, 63 to pay the amount of the par value of shares in full with a
type of consideration that can be valued with reasonable accuracy. If
a shareholder received shares without paying the required considera-
tion, he has for many years been potentially liable for the amount of
the shortage in the event of the corporation's insolvency under various
common law theories relating to watered stock.' 64
Creditors were protected against withdrawal of assets by share-
holders as early as 1825 by general corporation statutes which gave
them a remedy against directors where a particular distribution to
shareholders would reduce the net assets of the corporation (total
assets less total liabilities) to an amount less than the amount of the
"capital stock."' 65 This formula, restated in terms of a surplus test
(i.e., the excess of net assets over stated capital), was used by the old
act.'66 A surplus test may have afforded creditors sufficient protection
before no-par stock was authorized, since most of the surplus probably
then arose from earnings rather than from amounts of capital con-
tributed by shareholders in excess of the required stated capital. 6
But with the advent of no-par shares and the availability of corporate
power to determine what portion of the consideration received for no-
par shares should be transferred to stated capital and what portion
should be transferred to surplus, 6 ' protection of creditors and senior
shareholders required a re-examination of the breadth of the fund
available for distribution to shareholders. The New Act, in recogni-
tion of these interests, has distinguished between surplus arising from
earnings and other types of surplus ("capital surplus"), 69 and has
made earned surplus the primary source for dividend paymentsY.10
Capital surplus under the New Act is treated more like stated capital
" See Stevens, Stock Issues Under The Uniform Business Corporation Act, 13
CORNELL L.Q. 399, 400-18 (1928).
162 Ibid.
' See discussion at text accompanying note 206 infra.
' See discussion at text accompanying note 290 infra.
" See N. Y. Laws 1825, ch. 325, § 2.
" See WASH. REv. CODE: § 23.01.250(4) (1958).
"' See Garrett, Capital and Surplus Under the New Corporation Statutes, 23 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROB. 239, 240 (1958).
1 See New Act § 20; WAsH. Rav. CODE § 23.01.240(1) (1958) and text discussion
infra at note 273.
'See New Act §§ 3(10), (11), (12).
' See New Act § 45(1) and text discussion infra Part II under the heading
"Operation of Basic Dividend Limitations."
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than like earned surplus and is less readily available for distribution
to shareholders.""
Although American corporation laws generally work to maintain in
the corporation net assets equal to the amount of legal capital, most
modern statutes recognize that, in addition to creditors, preferred and
common shareholders, employees, and the public have an interest in
the size of the fund available for distribution.'72 Hence, they allow
certain distributions of assets to shareholders in furtherance of the
interests of one of these other interested groups even though the assets
remaining after the distribution will not meet the legal capital test.
Both acts permit distributions of assets to shareholders in wasting-
asset corporations from depletion reserves.' 3 The New Act (but not
the old) permits dividends to be paid from current earnings despite the
fact that the net assets after the dividend is paid will not be equal to
the amount of the stated capitalY.74 In addition, most modern corpora-
tion statutes permit the amount of the legal capital-the creditors'
"cushion"-to be reduced in various circumstances where it is thought
that the creditors' interest is protected by sufficient notice. Both acts
permit the redemption of preferred stock with a corresponding reduc-
tion of the amount of stated capital.' Both acts also permit the stated
capital to be reduced with varying consequences: under the old act,
stated capital can be reduced and distributed to shareholders as long
as the value of the assets of the corporation after the distribution
exceeds the total amount of its debts plus the amount of its capital
stock so reduced;' the New Act provides that any surplus arising
from a reduction of capital will be capital surplus and hence distri-
butable only on further action by the shareholders. 7
Because of their similarity on the one hand to dividends and on the
other to reductions of capital, modern statutes regulate the circum-
stances under which share repurchases may be made. Repurchases in
1 See Hackney, The Financial Provisions of the Model Business Corporation
Act, 70 HA v. L. REv. 1357, 1389-90 (1957) and text infra Part II under the heading
"Operation of Basic Dividend Limitations."
. See, e.g., Berks Broadcasting Co. v. Craumer, 356 Pa. 620, 52 A.2d 571 (1947);
BAKER & CARY, CASES ON CORPmOATIONS 1171 (3d unabr. ed. 1959).
1 See New Act § 45(2), WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.250(7) (1958) and text infra
Part II under the heading "Dividends By Wasting Asset Corporations."
17" New Act § 45(1). See also text discussion infra Part II under the heading
"Nimble Dividends."
'
1 See New Act § 68 and WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.440 (1958). See also text dis-
cussed infra Part II under the heading "Share Redemptions and Purchases."
"' WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.430 (1) (1958).
'
1New Act § 72. See text discussion infra Part II under the heading "Reductions
of Capital."
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Washington up to 1947 were subject to the strict English rule that a
corporation did not normally have capacity to repurchase its own
sharesY The cases took the view that the payment of the purchase
price effected a reduction of capital stock which was illegal because of
failure to comply with the statutory procedure for capital stock reduc-
tions. 9  In 1947, the old act was amended to authorize share re-
purchases so long as they were made from the corporation's surplus. 1 '"
The New Act restricts repurchases except to the extent of earned
surplus (or capital surplus if authorized by article provision or share-
holder vote) but makes an exception for several types of share re-
purchases which may be made from stated capital.'8 ' To the extent
that surplus is used to measure the corporation's right to purchase its
own shares, such surplus is restricted under the New Act so long as
such shares are held as treasury shares.""2 Upon disposition or cancel-
lation of treasury shares the restriction is removed pro tanto.1 '
A. Regulation of Share Issues*
1. Subscriptions for Shares. The New Act makes a number of
minor changes in the old law relating to share subscriptions. Incor-
porators are no longer required to be subscribers.' Written pre-
incorporation subscriptions are now to be irrevocable for a period of
six months' 8 (rather than twelve, as under the old act') unless the
'See Gose, Legal Significance of "Capital Stock." 32 WASH. L. REV. 1, 26-27(1957). For the development of the law outside Washington see Dodd, Purchase and
Redemption by a Corporation of its Own Shares: The Substantive Law, 89 U. PA. L.
REV. 697, 698-704 (1941) ; Herwitz, Installment Repurchase of Stock: Surplus Limni-
tations, 79 HAnv. L. REV. 303, 305-306 (1965).
See, e.g., Kom v. Cody Detective Agency, 76 Wash. 540, 136 Pac. 1155 (1913).
tm See WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.120(2) (1958).
New Act § 6. See also text discussion infra Part II under the heading "Share
Redemption and Purchases" for consideration of whether the New Act permits
repurchases only to the extent of one-half of appropriate surplus.
a' New Act § 6 ff 2.
tm Ibid.
* Consideration of share dividends, logically a part of this section, has been post-
poned until after restrictions on dividends have been considered in Part II.
"' Compare New Act § 55, with WAsH. Rav. CODE § 23.01.030(1) (h) (1958).
Presumably this step is part of the general attempt in the New Act to simplify
incorporation procedures. See generally New Act §§ 54, 55.
" New Act § 17.
" WAS . REv. CODE § 23.01.060(1) (a) (1958). Both acts thus avoid the confusion
as to the status of a subscription agreement covering shares in a corporation yet to
be formed. Compare Collins v. Morgan Grain Co., 16 F.2d 253 (9th Cir. 1926) (a
preincorporation subscription is a continuing offer to the proposed corporation
which could not be accepted by the corporation until it came into existence and there-
fore was revocable) with Minneapolis Threshing Mach. Co. v. Davis, 40 Minn. 110,
41 N.W. 1026 (1889) (a preincorporation agreement by a number of subscribers con-
stitutes a contract inter se and therefore is irrevocable from the date of subscription).
See generally Schwenk, Pre-Incorporation Subscriptions: 7he Offer 7heory and-
What is an Offer?, 29 VA. L. REv. 460 (1943); Morris, The Legal Effect of Pre-
Incorporation Stock Subscriptions, 34 W. VA. L. Ray. 219, 221-31 (1928).
[VOL. 41 :207
WASHINGTON BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT
subscription agreement provides otherwise.8 7 or unless all subscribers
consent to revocation.' After the period of irrevocability, preincor-
poration subscriptions may be revoked by the subscriber unless the
corporation's certificate of incorporation has been issued, in which
event subscribers under both acts automatically become sharehold-
ers.180
' WASH. REV. CODE § 23.01.060(1) (1958) has the same provision. New Act § 17
may be interpreted as permitting the requirement of a writing to be eliminated by
the terms of an oral subscription agreement ("a subscription for shares of a corpora-
tion to be organized shall be in writing... unless othervise provided by the terms
of the subscription agreement..."). The Model Act source provision does not require
that the agreement be written. Model Act § 16. The writing requirement presumably
was added to coordinate with WASH. REV. CODE § 23.01.060 (1958) which clearly did
not permit the requirement of a writing to be waived. Hence, it seems unlikely that
the requirement in New Act § 17 can be eliminated by oral agreement.
I Although WASH. REV. CODE § 23.01.060 (1958) does not explicitly permit all
subscribers to consent to a revocation, this right would seem encompassed by WASH.
REV. CODE § 23.01.060(2) (1958), providing that subscriptions may be revoked at any
time upon such grounds as may exist in law or in equity for the rescission of any
contract. See Pavey v. Collins, 31 Wn. 2d 864, 199 P.2d 571 (1948); cf., National
Realty Co. v. Neilson, 73 Wash. 89, 131 Pac. 446 (1913).
WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.060(2) (1958) is not duplicated by the New Act, presum-
ably on the ground that it adds nothing to the subscribers' common law defenses
against actions for the subscription price. Such defenses (e.g., material variation in
corporation formed from that represented, fraud, failure to form a de jure corporation)
are discussed in LATTiN, Co01oATioNs 113-18 (1959) ; 4 FLETCHER, PRIVATE ColronA-
TIONS §§ 1610-78, 1754-89 (1965 rev. vol.). See also Cataldo, Conditions in Subscrip-
tlions for Shares, 43 VA. L. Rxv. 353 (1957).
" New Act § 57; WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.050(2) (1958). Both acts thus avoid
the difficulties encountered in some jurisdictions concerning the need for acceptance
by the corporation of the subscription offer and the corporate action required to
demonstrate acceptance. See Frey, Modern Development in the Law of Pre-Incorp-
oration Subscriptins, 79 U. PA. L. REv. 1005, 1008-10 (1931) ; Morris, supra note 186,
at 225-28; Lukens, The Withdrawal and Acceptance of Pre-Incorporatio- Subscrip-
tions to Stock, 76 U. PA. L. REv. 423-31 (1928).
The acts appear to reach different results on the question of whether stated capital
should be increased at the moment the subscriptions are accepted by the corporation
or at some later time. The old act defined capital stock to include the par value of all
"allotted shares" and the value of any consideration agreed to be given or rendered as
payment for all allotted no-par shares. See WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.010(10) (a) (b)
(1958). "Allotment," under WASH. REV. CODE § 23.01.010(9) (1958), is defined as the
apportioning of shares to a subscriber in response to the application contained in
his subscription and is quite clearly distinguished in the old act from issuance of
shares. See Commissioners' Comment to § 20, MODEL [UxIFOitm] BUsINESS CoR'oRA-
ATION AcT, 9 U.L.A. 160 (1957). Hence, it would seem that capital stock would be
increased under the old act at the moment the subscription becomes binding, i.e., the
moment the subscriber becomes a shareholder. The New Act, however, defines stated
capital in terms of the par value shares "issued" and consideration received by a
corporation for all shares without par value. New Act § 3(10). Unless there is to be
a distinction between par and no-par shares on this question, it would appear that
stated capital should not be increased under the New Act until the consideration is
actually received for the shares. See Garrett, Capital and Surphs Under 77te New
Corporation Statutes, 23 LAW & CONTMP. PROB. 239, 248 (1958). Compare the
results under the two statutes as to when an investor becomes a shareholder. See note
249 infra. As between the two approaches, the New Act's seems more appropriate as
a means of satisfying the original legal concept of stated capital. On the general
question of when stated capital should be increased, see Manne, Accounting For
Share Issues Under Modern Corporation Laws, 54 Nw. U. L. Ray. 285, 305 (1959).
As is implicit in the discussion above, the New Act has rejected the old act's term
"allotment" in favor of the term "issue." Compare WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.240(1)
19661
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Both acts provide that unless the subscription agreement provides
otherwise, all subscriptions are to be paid for on the call of the board
of directors. 90 The New Act, however, goes on to require that calls
must be uniform as to all shares of the same class or series;' this
requirement varies only slightly from the common law rules formerly
in effect.' 92 Corporate remedies in the event of default in payment of
calls or installments now include actions at law and/or such other pen-
alties as may be prescribed by the by-laws; '93 the old statute specifically
recognized only actions at law'94 and the sale of shares in such circum-
stances, 9 ' but supplementary common law remedies gave corporations
about the same range of remedies as is available under the New Act.' 0
Also generally in accord with the old law is the New Act's provision
prohibiting penalties working a forfeiture unless the call or installment
has remained unpaid for a period of twenty days after written de-
mand. 97 Finally, the New Act codifies the common law rule that in
(1958) ("If, upon the allotment . . ."), with New Act § 20 ("In case of the issu-
ance . . ."), both dealing with allocation of consideration received for no-par shares
to stated capital and surplus. "Allotment" had been used in the old act to prevent the
confusion possible between "issue" in the sense of the making of the share contract
and "issue" as used in connection with execution and delivery of share certificates.
See Commissioners' Comment to § 20, MODEL [UNIFORM] BUSINESS CORPORATION Acr,
9 U.L.A. 159-60 (1957) ; BALLAXTINE, CORPORATIONS § 199 (1946). As the discussion
above suggests, counsel must be wary in interpreting the New Act provisions to
determine precisely which use of the word "issue" is intended.
' New Act § 17 2; WAsH. REv. CODE § 23.01.060(4) (1958).
.. New Act § 17 f 2.
"WASH. REV. CODE § 23.01.060 (1958) was silent on the need for uniform calls.
The common law rule was that calls must be uniform in their operation. See 4
FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1810 (1965 rev. vol.). Hence, if a shareholder had
already paid more than his share, directors could reduce the amount of his call so as
to equalize contributions within the class. The new requirement would not seem to
to permit this unless a rather strained interpretation is placed upon "uniform calls."
'New Act § 17 II 2. See also New Act § 24 and text discussion infra at note 287.
Other statutes give the board of directors power to determine whether a forfeiture
should be declared, see, e.g., N. Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 503(d), and conceivably this
approach should be considered as an alternative to the New Act's provision. The
New Act provision, however, seems preferable since it results in lodging the power
of determining whether directors have power to declare forfeitures in any circum-
stances in the shareholders, who are the interested parties. See New Act § 26.
.' See WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.200 (1958) and text discussion infra at note 287.
' WASH. REV. CODE § 23.01.230 (1958). The statute also provided that if a share-
holder was indebted to the corporation on account of unpaid subscriptions for shares,
the corporation would have a lien upon such shares for such indebtedness. On the
general subject of such liens, see 11 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 5261-82
(1958 rev. vol.). The New Act omits this provision, apparently on the ground that
it adds nothing to the corporation's rights in the circumstances.
The corporation's right to sue for the debt seems implied by WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 23.01.060(3), 23.01.230 (1958), and in any event was clearly recognized at common
law. See 4 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1829 (1965 rev. vol.).
Even in the absence of an authorizing statute, corporations have been permitted to
forfeit or sell stock for failure to pay subscription installments or calls where author-
ized by the terms of the articles, by-laws, or the subscription agreement. See 4
FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1856 (1965 rev. vol.).
' See New Act § 17 ff 2. WASH. REV. CODE § 23.01.230 (1958) permitted a sale of
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the event of a sale of shares following forfeiture, the excess of proceeds
realized over the amount due on the subscription shall be returned to
the subscriber.'
The recent North Carolina corporation statute suggests a number of
ways in which the New Act provision could be improved. For example,
that statute attempts to minimize the troublesome common law dis-
tinction between a subscription agreement and a contract of pur-
chase... by granting to the corporation subscription enforcement rights
regardless of the designation of the transaction."' It also attempts to
regulate clauses permitting payment for shares out of future earnings
and granting shareholder "put" options by providing that such pro-
visions will provide no defense against enforcement of the subscrip-
tions.2 "  The statute deprives subscribers of the defense against en-
forcement that they were not notified of their right to participate in
selecting the first board of directors, in adopting the by-laws, or in
otherwise perfecting the organization. 202 Finally, the statute, recogniz-
shares in these circumstances only if reasonable notice had been given and a similar
notice requirement was imposed by the courts in connection with forfeitures. See 4
FLETCHER, PRIvATE CORPORATIONS § 1862 (1965 rev. vol.).
Under New Act § 17 ff 2, written demand shall be deemed to be made when deposited
in the United States mail in a sealed envelope addressed to the subscriber at his last
known address. WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.230 (1958) required a registered letter and
publication in a newspaper published in the county where the corporation has its
registered office.
' See New Act § 17 ff 2; 4 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATINS § 1867 at 681 (1965
rev. vol.) (so stating the common law rule without citation of authority).
Although the New Act is much clearer on enforcement proceedings than the old
act, a number of minor questions remain. For example, assume the by-laws permit
forfeiture in the event of non-payment and the shares are forfeited after some pay-
ments have been made. The shares would then seem to revert to the status of autho-
rized but unissued shares and the amount received would seem to result in an increase
of capital surplus. This is the result under N. Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 503(d). Another
question relates to how one is to determine when a sale of shares involves shares
forfeited under a subscription agreement. See Note, 13 SYRAcUsE L. REv. 93, 94
(1961). Here perhaps the answer should be that the next sale of shares after a for-
feiture is presumed to include such shares. A third question is whether the corpora-
tion or its creditors can maintain an action to recover a balance due on a subscrip-
tion after the shares have been regularly forfeited or sold for nonpayment. See in this
connection 4 FLETCHER, PRIVATE COI'ORTIONS § 1867 (1965 rev. vol.).
-' 5 See, e.g., BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 191 (1946). Absent a provision of the
type mentioned in text, a subscriber's liability under a contract of purchase is deter-
mined by contract rules, and, in particular, by the rules governing dependent and
concurrent promises. Under these rules, the corporation must be able to tender a
share certificate in a going business to enforce the contract, and if the corporation
is bankrupt, the subscriber is excused from performing.
'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-43(a), (h) (Supp. 1965).
'
4 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-43(e) (Supp. 1965), excepts from the provision in text
subscriptions by employees. Escape provisions can still be used as grounds for an
action against promoters and officers of the corporation with knowledge thereof. For
a general discussion of such clauses and the problems they engender, see BALLANTINE,
CORPORATIONS § 194 (1946).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-43 (f) (Supp. 1965). The statute obviously was designed
to overcome the result in Windsor Hotel Co. v. Scheub, 76 W. Va. 1, 84 S.E. 911
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ing the analogy between releases of subscription obligations and shaxe
purchases by the corporation, °3 empowers the board of directors to
determine whether and upon what terms the obligation of any sub-
scriber should be compromised, °4 subject to the surplus limitations
placed upon share repurchases. 5
2. Consideration for Shares. The New Act makes only slight
changes in the existing law relating to the amount of consideration for
which shares may be issued. Par continues to be the minimum for
shares having a par value.20 6 No-par shares may now be issued, as
before, for the consideration expressed in dollars fixed by the directors
unless the articles reserve to the shareholders the right to fix the
consideration.0 7 Share dividends are now explicitly deemed to have
(1915). The draftsmen apparently concluded that the defense in most circumstances
was being utilized as an easy vehicle for reneging on subscriptions and that true
failure of consideration cases could be solved by the courts despite the instant pro-
vision. See Latty, Some Miscellaneous Novelties In The New Corporatio Statutes,
23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROS. 363, 366 (1958).
See N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-54(K) (Supp. 1965); BAKER & CARY, CASES ON
COR'ORATIONS 767 (3d unabr. ed. 1959) ; Note, Release of Stock Subscriptions, 53
HARv. L. REv. 313 (1939).
The common law rule is that there may be no release, absent statute, article or
by-law provision, except by unanimous consent of shareholders and without prejudice
to creditors. See, e.g., Myers v. C. W. Toles & Co., 287 Mich. 340, 283 N.W. 603
(1939). In Washington, however, there is authority that the trust fund doctrine
overrides consent of all shareholders and lack of prejudice to creditors. See Murphy
v. Panton, 96 Wash. 637, 165 Pac. 1074 (1917). Hence, the North Carolina provision
would be particularly important in this state.
' See discussion in text infra Part II under the heading "Share Redemptions
and Purchases."
6 See New Act § 18 f 1 ; WASH. Ry. CODE § 23.01.150(3) (1958). The New Act
expressly provides that par shares may be issued for a consideration expressed in
dollars, above par, as shall be fixed by the board of directors. Although it Was not
clear under the old act who determined the price at which par value shares could be
sold, see WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.150(3) (1958), this power undoubtedly rested in
the directors in the absence of article provisions to the contrary. See 11 FLETCHER,
PRivATE Coa'oRAToxrs § 5156 (1958 rev. vol.). It was clearly implied in the old act
that consideration would be expressed in dollars in the original subscription agree-
ment. See WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.150(3) (1958). Moreover, the old act required
that a statement be filed Within 30 days of incorporation or within 90 days of each
subsequent allotment of shares setting forth a description of the consideration,
including valuation thereof, received or to be received in payment for shares allotted.
WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.180(1) (b) & (c) (1958). Thus, the consideration for shares
was at least expressed in dollars by indirection.
The New Act requires a similar report only in the case of a corporation with
no-par shares, and then apparently only at incorporation. See New Act § 138.
'See New Act § 18 ff 2. Under WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.150(4) (1958), if the
subscription for no-par shares had been signed before incorporation, the incor-
porators were empowered to fix the consideration for the shares; if the subscription
had been signed after incorporation, the shareholders had the power to fix the re-
quired consideration unless the power had been delegated to the directors by resolu-
tion or in the articles. As to the importance of following the statutory procedure in
fixing the consideration, see Triplex Shoe Co. v. Rice & Hutchins, Inc., 17 Del. Ch.
356, 152 Atl. 342 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
Although some early decisions took the position that no consideration was re-
quired for no-par shares, see Speakman v. Bernstein, 59 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1932) ;
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been issued in consideration of that part of the corporation's surplus
which is transferred to stated capital." 8 Treasury shares may now be
disposed of for any consideration fixed by the directors, 20 9 as was
presumably the case under the old law.210 Finally, the consideration
for resulting shares in a conversion or exchange is now explicitly
recognized as the sum of the stated capital allocable to the original
shares, any surplus required to be transferred to stated capital on the
issuance of the resulting shares, and any additional consideration paid
to the corporation in connection wiith the issuance.21'
Neither act provides an answer to the rather basic question of
whether the existence of a liquidation preference should serve to fix the
minimum consideration for which shares may be issued." 2 The
desirability of such a requirement would seem to depend on whether
the liquidation preferences of the recipient shareholders and the
liquidation interests of other shareholders are sufficiently protected by
Johnson v. Louisville Trust Co., 293 Fed. 857 (6th Cir. 1923), it now seems clear
that the statutory consideration requirements apply to no-par shares. See, e.g.,
Triplex Shoe Co. v. Rice & Hutchins, Inc., supra; Bodell v. General Gas & Elec.
Corp., 15 Del. Ch. 119, 132 Atl. 442 (1926), aff'd, 15 Del. Ch. 420, 140 At. 264 (1927);
Stone v. Young, 210 App. Div. 303, 206 N.Y. Supp. 95 (4th Dep't 1924).
In addition to the statutory limitations upon the directors' discretion noted in
text above, the directors are under a fiduciary duty in fixing a reasonable price for
the issue of shares, with or without par value. See, e.g., Bodell v. General Gas &
Elec. Corp., supra. At least two states have incorporated this principle into their
corporation statutes. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.16 (1947) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-53
(a) (4) (1965).
On the general question of the use of par shares as against no-par shares, see
generally 1 DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF COR'ORATIONS 57-65 (5th ed. 1953);
GUTHMANN & DOUGALL, CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICY 141-46 (4th ed. 1962) ; Israels,
Problems of Par and No-Par Shares: A Reappraisal, 47 CoLum. L. REv. 1279 (1947).
New Act § 18 ff 4. The same result is implied by WASH. REv. CODE §§ 23.01.250(6), 23.01.150 (1958). See New Act § 45(4), WASH. REV. CODE § 23.01.250(6) (1958),
and text infra Part II, under the heading "Share Dividends," on the question of the
amount of surplus that must be transferred to stated capital.
SNew Act § 18 11 3.
nWAsH. REV. CODE § 23.01.120 (1958) simply states that the corporation has
power to sell shares of its own capital stock. As a general rule, the price for treasury
shares may be set by the board of directors in the exercise of its business judgment.
See, e.g., Fars v. Beck, 74 Colo. 480, 222 Pac. 652 (1924) ; Sandier v. Schenley Indus.,
Inc., 32 Del. Ch. 46, 79 A.2d 606 (Ch. 1951) ; State ex rel. Weede v. Bechtel, 244
Iowa 785, 56 N.W.2d 173 (1952). The generalization may break down where the
shares were originally issued for water, donated back, and later sold for less than par
or stated value. See BAKER & CARY, CASES ON COPORATIONS 849 (3d unabr. ed. 1959);
LATr.IN, CORORATIONS 414 (1959).
n New Act § 18 ff 5. For the instances where surplus would be capitalized in such
connection, see text discussion supra under "Convertible Shares" and New Act § 15 (5).
The only provision in the old act even remotely related to the New Act provision
is WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.420 (1959), which deals only with certain types of
recapitalization exchanges where stated capital is to remain constant But it would
appear that similar results would obtain under the old statutory scheme.
'The question is posed in 2 HERWITZ, CASES IN BUSINESS PLANNING 225 (temp.
ed. 1964) ; Hills, Model Corporation Act, 48 HARv. L. REv. 1334, 1355 n.26 (1935);
Katz, Accounting Problems in Corporate Distributions, 89 U. PA. L. Rxv. 764. 776-78(1941).
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other provisions of the acts or by common law remedies. While the
old act contains no provisions relating to either aspect of the problem,
the New Act has a number of provisions affording protection to the
recipient shareholder's liquidation preference. Thus, the New Act
provides that only consideration received in excess of the involuntary
liquidation preference of no-par shares having such a preference can
be allocated to other than stated capital.213 And it further provides
that distributions can not be made from earned surplus ,214 "nimble"
current earnings,21 5 or reduction and capital surplus, 216 nor for re-
demption or purchase of redeemable shares,1 7 until the liquidation
preference is protected. But protection of this nature is not extended
to share purchases21 nor to dividends by wasting asset corporations. - "
The recipient shareholder's interest in these circumstances can be
protected either by a provision requiring that consideration for the
shares originally equal the liquidation preference or by separate pro-
visions preventing such distributions where the preference is not then
3 See New Act § 20 1 2. It is not clear why this provision ignores the possibil-
ity of low par shares with a high liquidation preference. Also, it is not clear why
the liquidation preference protected should not be the higher of the voluntary and
involuntary preferences. See Manne, Accomiting For Share Issues Under Modern
Corporation Laws, 54 Nw. U. L. REv. 285, 301 (1959).
Compare CAL. CORP. CODE § 1900(b) requiring all consideration received for no-par
preference shares to be credited to stated capital. It is not clear why the excess of
consideration received for no-par preference shares over the amount of the preference
should be transferred to stated capital. See 1 BALLANTINE & STERLING, CALIFORNIA
CoRpORATIoNs LAws 329-30 (5th ed. 1965), stating only that sales giving rise to such
excess are rare.
"1 See the second sentence of New Act § 45(1), which, read literally, would pro-
duce such a result. See text infra Part II under the heading, "Operation of Basic
Dividend Limitations," for a discussion as to the possible restriction of such limita-
tion to nimble dividends.
" See New Act § 45(1), which protects the voluntary liquidation preference,
and text discussion infra Part II under the heading "Nimble Dividends."
" New Act § 46(4) protects voluntary liquidation preferences against distribu-
tions from capital surplus. See text discussion infra Part II under the heading
"Operation of Basic Dividend Limitations." New Act § 71 (5) requires that in cer-
tain reductions of capital, the corporation's total stated capital can not be reduced
below the involuntary liquidation preferences plus the par value of shares without
such preferences. Other forms of capital reduction (see New Act §§ 60, 70) do not
contain this protection, but surplus arising from such reductions is capital surplus
(see New Act § 72) and hence subject to the previously noted restrictions. See text
discussion infra Part II under the heading "Reductions of Capital."
2 See New Act § 68, which protects the involuntary liquidation preferences of
senior or equal class shares, and text discussion infra Part II under the heading
"Share Redemptions and Purchases."
21 Because of the fact that both New Act § 6 and New Act § 3(a) regulate the
acquisition of treasury shares, share purchases can be made only to the extent of
one-half of a corporation's earned surplus. But the shares may thereafter be cancelled,
possibly freeing the entire earned surplus, without regard to the liquidation pref-
erences of senior shares. See New Act § 70 and text discussion infra Part II under
the heading "Share Redemptions and Purchases."
- See New Act § 45(2) and text discussion infra Part II under heading "Divi-
dends by Wasting Asset Corporations."
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protected."' Of these two alternatives, requiring the original consid-
eration for preference shares to be equal to the preference will avoid
the dilution of the liquidation interest of other classes of shares other-
wise possible in the absence of such a requirement. 2 ' But this require-
ment would seriously hamper financing flexibility,222 and it would seem
that the liquidation preference of other shareholders could be ade-
quately protected by the ordinary equitable doctrines restricting
directors' discretion in connection with share issuances.223 Hence, it
would seem unnecessary to require that the minimum consideration
for shares be equal to the liquidation preference; 224 but it also seems
clear that distributions for share purchases and by wasting asset
corporations should be prohibited where the liquidation preference is
not then protected.225
The New Act adds a specific provision permitting corporations to
pay or allow reasonable expenses of organization or reorganization, and
reasonable expenses of and compensation for the sale or underwriting
- See Manne, supra note 213, at 300.
See Hills, Model Corporation Act, 48 HARv. L. Rv. 1334, 1355 n.26 (1935).
Consider a fact situation like that discussed in ILL. Ops. ATr'y GEN. 618(1933) : a new corporation was to be formed to take over certain bonded indebtedness
of an existing corporation and the general creditors were willing to accept no-par
preferred shares in lieu of claims provided the liquidation preference was equal
to the face amount of present claims; the value of the property to be received by the
new corporation would not support stated capital including the amount of the pre-
ferred's liquidation preference.
Generally, a two-thirds vote of the affected class of shareholders would be
necessary to authorize a new class of preference shares for issuance. See New Act
§§ 60, 62. If the shareholders had previously authorized the directors to fix the terms
of a series of preferred shares (see New Act § 16(2)), the directors could fix the
liquidation preference of the series to be issued. Their fixing of the preference
would, however, be subject to equitable scrutiny. See Note, Judicial Cmotrol Over the
Fairness of the Issue Price of New Stock, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1133 (1958).
But see Commonwealth & So. Corp., 13 S.E.C. 84 (1943) where the Commis-
sion denied the request of a registered public utility holding company to reduce the
capital attributable to shares with a liquidation preference on the ground that such
reduction would be ineffective to protect the company on a contemplated distribution
that might otherwise have impaired capital. The Commission interpreted the im-
pairment of capital statute to refer to the original contributed capital of the shares
in question.
- It may be argued that share dividends ought to be an exception to the proposi-
tion advanced in the text, even if the liquidation preference limitations are added
in the share purchase and wasting asset corporation distribution areas. See CAL.
CORP. CODE § 1506. The operation of the New Act § 20 2 requirement would generally
prevent gross disparities between stated capital and the liquidation preference of
shares with such preferences, since usually there will be a reasonable correlation
between the consideration received and the liquidation preference. With share
dividends, however, the disparity may be gross, at least if the accountants' rules (see
discussion infra Part II under the heading "share dividends") are not incorporated
into New Act § 45(4) (b). But it is not clear that such a disparity has any import
where distributions are restricted until the preferences are protected. The disparity
would have more significance if earned surplus were not subject to the liquidation
preference limitation for then the preference protections in essence only guarantee
that the preference protections will not get any worse.
1966]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
of its shares, out of the consideration they receive in payment for their
shares without thereby rendering such shares not fully paid.220 At first
glance it may seem that this provision resolves the various problems
that can arise in connection with the issuance of shares for promoters'
preincorporation services2 7 or underwriting commissions. 228 On closer
inspection, however, it will be noted that the section does not provide
that these services are acceptable as consideration, 229 but rather only
overcomes the line of authority to the effect that payment of such
expenses amounted to a discount on the shares. 230  Indeed, there may
still be questions on underwriting commissions where the corporation
contracts with the underwriter for a sale to the underwriter of par
value shares for less than par.
2 3 1
A fundamental question that may be raised with respect to the
consideration quantity provisions in both acts is whether it should be
possible for going concerns to issue fully paid par value shares for less
than par when the issue price represents the best price obtainable. 32
' New Act § 21. The closest provision in the old act is WASH. REv. CoE §
23.01.150(2) (1958), which permits subscriptions for shares to be paid for with
necessary services actually rendered to the corporation.
' See 2 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 795-97 (1937) for an excellent sum-
mary of the problem.
'For a discussion of the problem, see Note, Compensation for Serzices Rendered
in Financing a Corporation: Payment by the Issue of Stock, 55 HARv. L. REv. 1365,
1367-70 (1942). The only comment to the Model Act source provision is that the
section "permits organization and underwriting expenses to be treated realistically
as expenses rather than carried on the corporate balance sheet as assets in an attempt
to show on the books receipt of full consideration for the shares." 1 MODEL ACT
ANN. § 20 11 4. On the accounting treatment of these expenses, see Bullard, Corporate
Accounting and The Law, 1953 WASH. U. L. Q. 32, 35-38; Manne, Accounting for
Share Issuws Under Modern Corporation Laws, 54 Nw. U. L. REv. 285, 297-99 (1959).
' Indeed, the thrust of New Act § 21 seems to be that the consideration paid for
the shares is distinct from such services. On the question of whether services of this
nature are acceptable consideration, see International Prods. Co. v. Estate of Vail,
97 Vt. 318, 123 At. 194 (1924) (holding underwriters' services are not acceptable
consideration); and cases cited infra at note 241 regarding promoters' services.
Bonbright is of the opinion that the courts' hesitancy with such services arises
because of appraisal difficulties. See 2 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 796
(1937).
See, e.g., Australian Inv. Trust, Ltd. v. Strand & Pitt Street Properties, Ltd.,
[19321 A.C. 735 (P.C.).
' Can it be said that the consideration to be received by the corporation is par
value and that out of such consideration the underwriters were to be "allowed" a
specific commission per share? See Bullard, Corporate Accounting and the Law,
1953 WASH. U. L. Q. 32, 34-35, where the author suggests that the contract be written
for consideration equal to par and a separate payment to the underwriters of the
"spread."
"-In Handley v. Stutz, 139 U.S. 417 (1891), the Court held that a going concern
in economic difficulty could sell its shares at a market price less than par for the
purpose of "recuperating itself and providing new conditions for the successful
prosecution of business." The corporation statute there involved, however, did not
specifically require that the shares be issued for consideration equal to par value.
This result would seem impossible under the par consideration requirements in both
the old and the New Act. For commentary on Handley v. Stutz, supra, see LATrIN,
CORPORATIONS 412-14 (1959) ; Bonbright, Shareholders' Defenses Against Liability To
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A number of jurisdictions permit such sales where the shares are not
salable at par 33 on the ground that par value should not be conceived
of as an advertisement of the capital actually contributed but rather
should be considered merely as a device fixing the issue price and
theoretical contribution of each shareholder to the capital of the
corporation.2 34  Although several procedures involving a shareholder
vote are available by which the discount situation can be avoided,235
a provision permitting discount sales should be considered as a means
of providing corporations with greater financial flexibility and of
avoiding inadvertent watered stock situations.3 6
The New Act imposes the same basic requirements with respect to
types of consideration for which shares"' may be validly issued that
are imposed by the old act: cash, property, and services actually per-
formed for the corporation may be paid as consideration for shares 38
Creditors On atered Stock, 25 CoLum. L. REv. 408, 429-33 (1925) ; Wickershamn, 77;e
Capital of a Corporation, 22 HARv. L. REv. 319, 330-32 (1909).
'CAL. CoR'. CODE § 1110; Im. ANN. STAT. § 25-205(c) (1960) ; KEN. GEN. STAT.§ 17-3211; MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 20(c)(e) (1957); RI. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§
7-3-3 to 7-3-9 (1956) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-17; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3041 (1961).
"' See 1 BALLANTINE & STERLING, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAWS 221-23 (4th ed.
1965); Ballantine, A Critical Survey of the Illinois Bustess Corporation Act, 1 U.
.HL L. REv. 357, 360-61 (1934).
" The most obvious procedures affording protection are creation of a new class
of low or no-par shares and reduction of par value of the shares outstanding. Both
would require a two-thirds shareholder vote. See New Act § 61.
2 BAKER & CARLY, CASES ON CORPORATIONS 792 (3d unabr. ed. 1959) present the
case of a large company offering a stock option to a senior officer at the market price
without appreciation of the fact that the market price was below par. Such problems
could be avoided with a well drafted provision of the sort described above.
'Although neither act specifically so states, it seems clear that the quality
requirements relate to the issuance of no-par shares as well as to par shares. See, e.g.,
Bodell v. General Gas & Elec. Corp., 15 Del. Ch. 119, 127, 132 Atl. 442, 446 (1926).
The acts appear to reach different results on the question of whether the quality
requirements apply to sales of treasury shares. Compare 1 MODEL ACT. ANN. § 17,
1111 3, 4, specifically excluding such shares from such requirements, with WAsE. REv.
CODE §§ 23.01.150(2), 23.01.160(3) (1958), making no distinction. The New Act
approach may well give rise to attempts to avoid the quality requirements by use of
treasury shares, see discussion note 210 supra, but will undoubtedly prove useful in
issuing shares for future services. See text discussion infra following note 241.
duNew Act § 19; VASE. REv. CODE § 23.01.150(2) (1958). The old act also re-
quired that services rendered to the corporation must be necessary. This qualification,
which never has been interpreted by the Washington court, appears relevant only to the
issue of the value of the services to the corporation and thus overlaps the problems
of valuation discussed in text infra at note 244.
1 MODEL Acr ANN. § 18 ff 4, states: "property, tangible or intangible, is valid
consideration for shares, provided it is capable of valuation and is honestly valued.
The same is true of services actually performed." As 2 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF
PROPERTY 796 (1937) states:
There has been a fairly general consensus of holdings excluding (a) the right
to use the name or influence of an individual, (b) an agreement by directors to
perform acts which fall within their regular duties, (c) agreements to serve as
directors and officers, (d) endorsement by promoters or directors of the notes of
the corporation, (e) business plans of problematic value, (f) unpatented formulas,
inventions, and trademarks of speculative value, and (g) under certain circum-
stances, services by directors or promoters in stock-selling campaigns.
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while obligations of the purchaser for future payments or services may
not.2 39 But neither act provides a clear answer as to whether services
performed before incorporation will serve as consideration,2 4 ° and, in
view of the courts' generally adverse attitude in the past toward this
type of consideration,241 careful planners must assume that it is not
acceptable. The time probably has come for a careful examination
into the reasons for the proscription of future services as consideration
found in both acts242 for there are many occasions in planning closely-
held corporations where it would be useful to issue shares in exchange
for a promise to perform future serices.2 4 3
A final New Act provision'14 dealing with consideration for shares
For a Washington example of unacceptable consideration, see Electromatic Cooling
Co. v. Milne-Ryan-Gibson, Inc., 160 Wash. 320, 294 Pac. 1113 (1931).
'New Act § 19; see WAsH. REv. CODE §§ 23.01.160(3), 23.01.150(2) (1958).
Note that there is nothing in any of these provisions which would forbid the issue
of shares (as distinguished from share certificates) in exchange for such obligations
of the shareholder. See Ballantine, A Critical Survey of the Illinois Business
Corporatim Act, 1 U. Cia. L. REv. 357, 361 (1934), and the discussion in note 249
infra as to when an investor becomes a shareholder under both acts.
"The question, of course, is whether preincorporation services can be said to
be performed for the corporation. With respect to the New Act, see note 229 supra.
Compare with the language in both Washington statutes, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-46(2)
(1965) ("labor or services actually rendered to the corporation or for its benefit in
its organization or reorganization"); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 504(a) ("labor or
services actually received by or performed for the corporation or for its benefit or
in its formation or reorganization, or a combination thereof").
"'See, e.g., Kirkup v. Anaconda Amusement Co., 59 Mont. 469, 197 Pac. 1005
(1921) and Lamphere v. Lang, 141 N.Y. Supp. 967 (Sup. Ct. 1913), holding that
promotion services were not "labor done" because they were performed before the
corporation was in a position to contract for them. Delaware courts, however, have
concluded that promoters' services are rendered for the corporation. See, e.g., Blish
v. Thompson Automatic Arms Corp., 30 Del. Ch. 538, 64 A.2d 581 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
See generally Cataldo, Limited Liability and Paymtent For Shares, 19 U. PiTT. L. REv.
727, 734-36 (1958).
'The reasons for the ban are generally thought to be that future services have
no value in the event of liquidation, are hard to value and are likely to be the target
of extravagant overestimations. See Herwitz, Allocation of Stock Between Scrzdces
and Capital in the Organization of a Close Corporation, 75 Hanv. L. REv. 1098, 1105-
1106 (1962). But various protective measures could be imposed to see that the
corporation receives the future services (e.g., escrowing the share certificates subject
to a condition subsequent). The fact that most or all of the shareholders are privy
to the agreement should eliminate chances of overreaching. Further, creditors seldom
rely upon capital structure representations in granting credit. Id. at 1109.
The problem is less severe under the New Act because treasury shares are appar-
ently exempt from the quality requirements. See note 237 supra. Moreover, the
contributor of future services in any event can validate his shares merely by contrib-
uting some modest amount of property; See Herwitz, supra, at 1111 & n.49. If the
services are in fact performed, at least one court has ruled that the certificates origi-
nally issued were merely voidable and that performance of the services rendered them
fully paid. Vineland Grape Juice Co. v. Chandler, 80 N.J. Eq. 437, 85 Atl. 213 (1912).
But see Palmer v. Scheftel, 183 App. Div. 77, 120 N.Y. Supp. 588 (1918).
" See, e.g., the hypothetical presented by Herwitz, supra note 242, at 1098-99.
"4 New Act § 19 1 3 states: "In the absence of fraud in the transaction, the judg-
ment of the board of directors or the shareholders, as the case may be, as to the value
of the consideration received for shares shall be conclusive." Unfortunately, the New
Act does not set forth any rules for determining when the directors, or the share-
holders, shall have such power. It may be thought that fixing the consideration for
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adds the words "in the absence of fraud in the transaction" to the cur-
rent provision2 ' that the value24 placed by shareholders or directors
on non-cash consideration received for shares is conclusive. The act
makes no attempt to define what will constitute fraud in such circum-
stances and thus the courts must now decide whether the standard
shall be actual fraud, constructive fraud, or failure to exercise reason-
able judgment.4 7 It would be helpful to the evaluating parties to fol-
low the lead of several states248 and define this crucial term.
3. Share Certificates. Both acts provide that certificates for shares
shall not be issued until the corporation has received the consideration
fixed for the shares. 249 Further, both acts require essentially the same
shares in dollars results in the valuation of the consideration received and that the
function therefore follows the assignments made in New Act § 18 1111 1, 2. But the
acts of setting the price for the shares and determining the value of the consideration
offered for such shares can be independent and hence any designation under New
Act § 18 ff 2 should empower the recipient to do both acts.
" WAsn. REv. CODE § 23.01.170(1) (a) (1958). The omission of the absence of
fraud clause was deliberate. See Stevens, Stock Issues Under the Uniform Business
Corporation Act, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 399, 419-20 (1928). See text discussion infra
note 302.
""It is obvious that both acts reject the "true value" rule (the value of the
property must actually equal the amount of the shares regardless of any question of
fraud or honest mistake) in favor of the "good faith" rule (value is a matter about
which men can differ and honest differences as to value are irrelevant). See 1 MODEL
AcT. ANN. § 18 II 4; Strickland v. Washington Bldg. Corp., 287 Il. App. 340, 4 N.E.2d
973 (1936). Less clear is the "value" which is to be the standard by which the
shareholders' or directors' determination is judged. The draftsmen of the old
[Uniform] act desired a "fair valuation." See 9 U.L.A. 161 (1957). The New Act
contains no hint as to the meaning to be attributed to "value." For an excellent
discussion of the courts' reactions to the problem, see 2 BONHRIGHT, VALUATION OF
PROPERTY 800-804 (1937).
"
47 Under the actual fraud standard, directors would not be liable even though they
consciously overvalued property if they can prove that they had no intent to defraud
those who might become creditors of the corporation. See, e.g., Taylor v. Walker,
117 Fed. 737 (N.D. Ill. 1902), aff'd, 127 Fed. 108 (7th Cir. 1903). Constructive
fraud, in contrast, requires proof of only two facts: (1) that the amount of the
shares issued exceeded the actual value of the property exchanged therefor; and (2)
that the directors deliberately and with knowledge of the real value of the property
overvalued it and paid out shares the value of which they knew was in excess of the
property's actual value. See, e.g., Douglass v. Ireland, 73 N.Y. 100 (1878). The
reasonable judgment rule, on the other hand, says that if an otherwise honest judg-
ment of value is reached without due examination into the elements of value, or is
based in part upon an estimate of matters which are not property, the director's
judgment is not conclusive. See Donald v. American Smelting & Ref. Co., 62 N.J. Eq.
729, 48 Atl. 771 (1901). Of these three standards, the reasonable judgment rule is
obviously the most severe since it tends in effect toward the true value rule.
2" See, e.g., OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §1701.19(A) (4) (1964) (defining an actual fraud
test); and 20 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.16, subd. 2 (1947) (defining the reasonable
judgment rule).
:" See New Act §§ 22 ff 4, 19 1 1; WAsH. REv. CODE §§ 23.01.160(1), 23.01.150(3),
(4) (1958).
A number of corporation statutes permit issuance of certificates for shares that
are not fully paid, as long as the amount remaining due is clearly shown on the
certificate. See 1 MODEL AcT ANN. § 21 ff 2.02(3). Delaying issuance of certificates
until the consideration for the share is received, however, prevents possible loss to
the corporation in the event a partly-paid share is transferred to a good faith pur-
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information to appear upon certificates to be issued by corporations
with a single class of shares. 50 The New Act, however, permits multi-
ple class corporations to avoid the old act requirement of a complete
or summary statement of share characteristics of each class upon each
certificate, with a statement that the corporation will furnish upon
request and without charge a complete statement to any shareholder.25'
The new provision is obviously designed to deal with the practical
problem of presenting a full description of the rights of each class in
a complex capital structure on a certificate,212 but complaints have
chaser. See New Act § 24 11 2; de Capriles & McAniff, The Financial Provisions
of the New (1961) New York Business Corporation Law, 36 N.Y.U.L. Ray. 1239,
1251 (1961). Investors under statutes permitting certificates to be issued on partly-
paid shares can be assured shareholders' rights, see id. at 1250, and hence the question
under the Washington statutes is whether an investor can acquire such rights before
the share certificates are issued. Both acts clearly answer the question when pre-
incorporation subscribers are involved. See text supra at note 189. Under the old
act it was also quite clear that an investor would become a shareholder upon an
allotment of shares to him and that an allotment was not conditioned on prior
payment of the consideration for the stock. WASH. REv. CoDE §§ 23.01.010(7),
23.01.150(1) (1958) ; 9 U.L.A. 160 (1957). The New Act omits this express statutory
structure, see note 189 supra, but New Act § 19 implies a clear distinction between
consideration for the issuance of shares and payment, and therefore it would appear
that shares can be issued without the consideration for shares being paid. See also
New Act § 24 f[ 4 implying that partly-paid shares can exist. Thus, it would appear
that the Washington type of statute results in a benefit to the corporation at no
particular cost to the investor.
A more fundamental question suggested by the above analysis is whether investors
ought to have shareholders' rights before they have paid full consideration for the
shares. The recently adopted New York corporation statute denies shareholder rights
in these circumstances except where the subscriber is a director, officer or employee.
See N. Y. Bus. CoRn. LAw §§ 504(h)-(i), & 505 (e). In the event that shareholder
rights are important, fractional shares could be used to insure that the investor
could vote his full pro-rata interest in the corporation. It would seem that this
approach should be considered as an alternative to the New Act scheme since the
Nev York approach eliminates the difficult question under the New Act as to when
an investor becomes a shareholder.
'Compare New Act § 22 11 3, with WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.140(2) (a) - (d)(1958).
Neither provision deals with possible requirements that restrictions on transfer
be placed upon the certificates. This requirement is currently posed by § 15 of the
Uniform Stock Transfer Act (WASH. REv. CODE § 23.80.150 (1958)) which provides
that "there shall be no restriction upon the transfer of shares ... by virtue of any by-
laws of such corporation, or otherwise, unless the right of the corporation to... the
restriction is stated upon the certificate." Effective June 30, 1967, this provision
will be repealed by UNrFoRm COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-204 which provides that "unless
noted conspicuously on the security a restriction on transfer imposed by the issuer
even though otherwise lawful is ineffective except against a person with actual
knowledge of it." Wash. Laws Ex. Sess. 1965, ch. 157, § 8-204.
For other matters that some corporation statutes have required on share certifi-
cates, see 1 MODEL AcT ANN. § 21 1f 4 and references therein.
' See New Act § 22 2; WASH. REV. CODE § 23.01.140 (2) (f) (1958).
"
2 Latty, Some Miscellaneous Novelties in the New Corporation Statutes, 23
LAw & CoNTEmp. PRoB. 363, 381 (1958), refers to one stock certificate that has an
estimated 17,000 words of text on the reverse side. Compressing such statement into
an available area of about six inches by five inches can only result in microscopic
print.
The New Act provision also avoids calling in all certificates each time a change
in share characteristics occurs.
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been raised as to whether such a provision, absent sanctions for failure
to perform, affords shareholders a ready means for receiving an accu-
rate statement of share characteristics."' This problem could be obvi-
ated by requiring that a statement of all share characteristics be filed
with the Secretary of State and made available for shareholder inspec-
tion,264 or by requiring the corporation to send to each shareholder a
complete statement. 5
A second change the New Act makes in the certificate content is to
eliminate the requirement that corporations state the total number of
shares they are authorized to issue.216  This information is of little
benefit to shareholders and its elimination prevents obsolescence of
certificates resulting from a new authorization of shares. 257 Another
change adds the relatively common provision that certificates with the
signatures of officers no longer employed may be issued as if the officers
were still employed.25 A final rather minor change limits the officers
eligible to sign certificates to the corporation's president or vice-presi-
dent and secretary or assistant secretary;259 this provision abrogates
the old power to delegate this responsibility in the articles or by-laws."'
4. Fraction of Shares. A problem frequently arises in connection with
the issuance of shares for share dividends or in reorganizations26 1 as to
the treatment to be afforded to shareholders whose shareholdings
would entitle them to a fraction of a share. The legal consequences of
the various alternatives open to corporations in this situation-issuance
of fractional shares, payment of cash for the fraction, or issuance of
scrip-were not clear under the old act.2" 2 The New Act in a rather
See Harris, The Model Business Corporation Act-Inzitation to Irrespon-
sibility, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 1, 11-12 (1955); Carrington, Experience in Texas With
ThI Model Business Corporation Act, 5 UTAH L. REV. 292, 300 (1957).
"This is the Texas solution to the problem. See 3A VEaR. Am. Tax. STAT., Bus.
COAR. ACT, art. 2.19 (1957) ; Carrington, supra note 253, at 300. See also, MASS. GEN.
LAws ch. 156 § 33 (1958); VT. STAT. tit. 11, § 263 (1955).
See Harris, supra note 253, at 11.
Compare New Act § 22 1 3, with WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.140(2) (e) (1958).
r See 1 MODEL ACT ANN. § 21 4.
New Act § 22 1. The New Act does not go on, as the Illinois Act now does,
to deal with the analogous problem arising where the corporate seal has been affixed
to certificates prepared for issuance but is changed before they are actually issued.
See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.21 (1965).
' New Act § 22 f 1.
'WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.140(1) (1958). Both acts permit facsimiles of officers'
signatures to be used if the transfer agent or registrar signs the certificate. See
New Act § 22 V 1; WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.140(1) (1958).
"'See, e.g., 1 MODEL AcT ANN. § 22 11 4. Fractional shares may also be used to
solve problems relating to partly-paid shares. See HENN, CovuoRAxoNs § 161 (1961).
- The only mention of fractions in the old act was in WASH. Rev. CODE §
23.01.140(4) (1958) which allowed corporations to issue fractional share warrants
evidencing the fraction of a share to which the shareholder is entitled to subscribe.
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extended provision gives corporations the option to issue fractions of a
share entitling the holder to voting rights, dividends, and liquidating
distributions in proportion to his fractional interest.26 Although this
provision serves a useful purpose in recognizing fractional shares and
clarifying the rights pertaining thereto," only closely-held corpora-
tions where the record-keeping inconvenience of fractions is small are
likely to use it as a solution to fractions problems.265 The New Act
rather surprisingly gives no express sanction26 to the relatively com-
mon past practice in publicly-held corporations 26 7 of paying for the
fractions in cash. This omission may be an attempt to discourage cash
payments because of their adverse tax consequences for recipients2 8I
The old act thus impliedly recognized that fractional shares could be issued, but no
indication appears as to whether these shares could vote, share in dividends, or share
in liquidation proceeds. See in this connection Commonwealth ex rel. Cartwright v.
Cartwright, 350 Pa. 638, 40 A.2d 30 (1944) holding that under the Pennsylvania
Business Corporation Act fractional shareholders could not vote at shareholder's
meetings. No prohibition exists in the old act against payment for the fraction in
cash, and apparently this is permissible. However, see Waring, Fractional Shares
Under Stock Dividend Declarations, 44 HAnv. L. Rav. 404, 407-13 (1931), as to possi-
ble questions with respect to this practice. Finally, although the old act does not men-
tion possible use of scrip in connection with fractions, its use would probably have been
justified in eliminating potential discrimination between shareholders possible under
the cash payment technique and in eliminating corporate inconvenience with frac-
tional shares. Id. at 413-21.
' New Act § 23.
- For the difficulties that may arise in the absence of such a provision, see note
262 supra, and Roberts, Fractional Corporate Shares, 47 Ky. L. REv. 507-12 (1959).
'See de Capriles & McAniff, The Financial Provisions of the New (1961)
New York Business Corporation Law, 36 N.Y.U.L. Ra,. 1239, 1251 (1961). See also
Waring, supra note 262, at 406, for the difficulties encountered by a large corporation
in connection with fractions. As more large corporations come to use electronic data
processing equipment on stock records the corporation's record-keeping task should
disappear as a factor. But a serious problem will remain with respect to market
mechanics for such fractions and hence their use by large corporations will probably
be discouraged.
If fractions are considered for use in a closely-held corporation, the implication
of New Act § 6, which permits the directors to repurchase fractions from stated
capital, (see text infra Part II under the heading "Share Redemptions and Pur-
chases."), should be carefully considered. Also relevant in planning is the line of
Delaware cases relating to the directors' fiduciary obligations regarding share re-
purchases. See Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964); Bennett v. Propp, 187
A.2d 405 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1962) ; Kors v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch. 47, 158 A.2d 136 (Ch.
1960). See also Latty, Some Miscellaneous Novelties in the New Corporation
Statutes, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 363, 381 (1958).
- The first sentence of New Act § 23 implies that the issuance of fractional
shares or scrip are not the only ways by which a corporation can deal with the
fractions problem. And, as noted above, New Act § 6 permits corporations to purchase
fractions from stated capital. However, absent an express statutory authorization,
there may be questions concerning the propriety of cash payments to shareholders
because of the dilution of their interests. See Waring, supra note 262, at 410-13.
Id. at 407.
' If the corporation has sufficient earnings and profits, the distribution of cash
by the corporation to the shareholder in place of a fractional share dividend would
be taxable to the shareholder as a dividend, i.e., as ordinary income. See INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, §§ 301(c), 316. Distributions in connection with certain types of
reorganizations, however, may have the effect of disqualifying the tax-free status
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and diluting effect upon the recipient's interest,269 but it would seem
more appropriate either to state clearly the consequences of cash pay-
ments, if they are permitted,270 or to prohibit the payments if the
recipient's interests outweigh the convenience to the corporation. The
New Act does recognize, however, a corporation's power to issue scrip
which entitles the holder to receive a certificate for a full share upon
surrender of scrip aggregating a full share.27' This scrip may be used
by a corporation in connection with an agency relation so that share-
holders have the option either to receive the fair market value of the
fraction at capital gains rates or to purchase at market a fraction
which, with their dividend fraction, will give them a whole share 272
Since the use of scrip allows corporations to avoid cash payments in
connection with a share issuance and works to the shareholder's bene-
fit, it would seem that this portion of the New Act provision will be
actively used in the future.
5. Allocation of Consideration Between Stated Capital and Capital
Surplus. The New Act explicitly,2 73 and the old act by implication,2 74
provide that consideration received for shares with par value shall
of the reorganization. See Rubenfeld, Handle expenses, fractiotal shares, escrows
in rcorganization with great care, 15 J. TAXATION 66 (1961).
' For examples of the diluting effect, see Waring, supra note 262, at 408-10. Gen-
erally the brokerage fee on small transactions makes it uneconomic for shareholders to
protect against dilution by buying shares on the market. See Sobieski, Fractional
Shares in Stock Dividends and Splits, 16 Bus. LAW. 204, 205 (1960).
' For an example of such a provision, see CAL. CoRe. CODE § 1113.
'New Act § 23. Scrip may be issued on the conditions that (1) it will be void
if not exchanged for certificates by a specified date, (2) the shares represented by
the scrip may be sold and the proceeds distributed to the shareholder, and (3) no
scripholder shall be entitled to vote, receive dividends, or share in liquidation
proceeds.
. Sobieski describes the arrangement as follows:
The proper answer, in my opinion, is for the issuing corporation not to
issue fractional shares but to make arrangements, at the company's expense, with
a bank or trust company to act as agent for the affected shareholders so that the
latter, at their option, during a limited period, may receive either the market
value of their fractional share, or purchase, at market, a fraction which, with
their dividend fraction, will give them a whole share. Stockholders entitled to
fractional shares will be mailed an order form to be sent the agent. If the
stockholder does nothing he will be deemed to have elected to take the cash
market value of this fraction.
Sobieski, supra note 269, at 204.
On the tax consequences to the shareholder of receipt of cash from the agent,
compare O.D. 859, 4 Cum . BULL. 24, with Special Ruling 12-21-60, 617 CCH FED.
TAX REP. ff 6306.
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 509(d), to call attention to this procedure, specifically
states that holders of scrip or fractions may be given an opportunity either to sell
their holdings or to buy additional scrip or fractions to make up a full share.
' New Act § 20 1 1.
' See WASH. REV. CODE § 23.01.010(10) (a) (1958), providing that "capital stock"
at any time equals the aggregate amount of par value of all allotted shares having a
par value; WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.240(2) (1958), providing that surplus paid in by
19661
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
constitute stated capital27 to the extent of the aggregate par value of
the shares, with any excess to be capital surplus.2 7 6 Both acts277 allow
directors to determine the respective portions of consideration received
for no-par shares which shall constitute stated capital and capital sur-
plus.2 78 The New Act, however, restricts the directors' discretion in
making the allocation where no-par shares279 with a liquidation pref-
erence are issued by limiting the amount that may be allocated to
capital surplus to the excess of the consideration over the shares' invol-
untary liquidation preference s.2 ° The New Act also changes the date
by which the allocation must be made from the former date of fixing
the consideration for the no-par shares2. to sixty days after issuance of
the shares.2
8 2
The major controversy that has arisen in connection with these pro-
shareholders shall be shown as "paid-in surplus"; and WASH. REV. CODE § 23.01.250
(4) (a) (1958), providing that any excess consideration received for shares not
shown in "capital stock" is a part of surplus, from which cash and property dividends
may be declared.
Under the old scheme, this would be "capital stock."
=" Under the old act this surplus would be "paid-in surplus." New Act § 20 1 4
specifically recognizes the power of the directors to transfer surplus to stated capital.
See also New Act § 3(10) (c). The old act did not have this provision, but it seems
reasonably clear that directors have the power under common law rules.
See New Act § 20 1 2; WASH. REV. CODE § 23.01.240(1) (1958).
'Under WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.240(1) (1958), the group holding the power
depended upon whether the consideration was received for a subscription signed
prior to incorporation (in which case the incorporators had the power) or subsequent
to the incorporation (in which case the shareholders had the power unless they or
the articles authorized the directors to so act). See WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.150(4)
(1958).
' It is not clear why the provision does not extend to low par preference shares,
for the problems are identical.
- New Act § 20 ff 2. The old act did not have this provision. Hence, absent
contract provisions to the contrary, the consideration paid for no-par preferred
shares could be distributed as dividends and the preferred's liquidation preference
made illusory. Gross cases probably could have been controlled by the general
fiduciary principles requiring directors to exercise their functions for all of the
shareholders and majority shareholders to afford fair treatment to the minority. See
Gose, Legal Significance of "Capital Stock," 32 WASH. L. REv. 1, 17-18 (1957) and
WASH. REV. CODE § 23.01.290(2) (1958). The problem, however seems clear enough
to merit statutory solution.
See text, supra at note 211, for a discussion of other problems relating to the
preferred's liquidation preference.
'WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.240(1) (1958).
' New Act § 20 ff 2. In the event that the allocation is not made within sixty
days after the issuance of the shares, all consideration constitutes stated capital. Once
such amounts are stated capital, they can be transferred to capital surplus only if the
required steps for reduction of capital are taken. See Jones v. First Nat'l Bldg.
Corp., 155 F.2d 815 (10th Cir. 1946).
New Act § 20 f1 3 also provides that if shares have been issued by a corporation
in a merger, consolidation, or an acquisition of all or substantially all of the assets
or shares of another corporation, any amount that would be capital surplus under the
general provisions of New Act § 20 may be allocated by the directors of the issuing
corporation to earned surplus, as long as the aggregate resulting earned surplus does
not exceed the sum of the earned surpluses before the merger or acquisition. For a
discussion of the effect such "pooling" situations have upon earned surplus, see infra
Part II under the heading "Operation by Basic Dividend Limitations."
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visions is whether the directors' discretion to allocate consideration
received for no-par shares to capital surplus ought to be restricted.283
For example, the Model Act as originally drafted permitted directors
to allocate no more than twenty-five per cent of the consideration re-
ceived to capital surplus.28 4 This restriction was presumably conceived
with a view toward preventing directors from freely distributing a
portion of the contributed capital as dividends. 285 The obvious alter-
native to this procedure, and one that may be more attractive because
of similar problems with low par shares, is to place restrictions upon
the availability of capital surplus, which the New Act does; 2 6 hence,
the desirability of a limitation on directors' allocation discretion will
be re-examined after the New Act limitations on the availability of
capital surplus are examined.
6. Shareholder Liability. Although the old2 7 and new28 8 provisions
regulating shareholder liability in connection with the issuance of
shares289 may appear quite similar, they in fact represent two quite
different approaches to the subject. The extent of the divergence be-
tween the two approaches can be best appreciated when viewed against
the backdrop of a brief history of watered shares liability.
" See generally Manne, Accounting for Share Issies Under Modern Corporation
Laws, 54 Nw. U.L. Rmv. 285, 292-99 (1959).
""See 1 MoDE. AcT ANN. § 19 ff 1 indicating the 25 per cent limitation was
deleted in 1957. Florida and Colorado at one time required all the consideration
for no-par shares to be credited to stated capital unless the certificate provided other-
wise. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31-1-15(3) (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.17 (1956).
Other states have allowed only one-third to one-half of the consideration to be credited
to capital surplus. See I MOnDEL ACT ANN. § 19 1 2.02(c).
mSee Manne, supra note 283, at 290-91; 293-95.
""See New Act § 46 and text discussion infra Part II under the heading
"Operation of Basic Dividend Limitations."
'VWASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.200(1) (1958) states:
A subscriber to or holder of shares of a corporation formed under this chapter
shall be under no liability to the corporation with respect to such shares other
than the obligation of complying with the terms of the subscription therefor;
but one who became a shareholder in good faith and without knowledge or notice
that the shares he acquired had not been fully paid for, shall not be liable to the
corporation with respect to such shares.
" New Act § 24 11 1 states: "A holder of or subscriber to shares of a corporation
shall be under no obligation to the corporation or its creditors with respect to such
shares other than the obligation to pay to the corporation the full consideration for
which such shares were issued or to be issued."
Both statutes contain exceptions to the general liability provisions for good
faith transferees (compare New Act § 24 1 2, witlh WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.200(1)(1958)), and executors, administrators, guardians, trustees, receivers, and assignees
for the benefit of creditors. (Compare New Act § 24 ff 3, with WASH. REv. CODE§ 23.01.200(3) (1958).) The New Act also exempts a pledgee of the shares and
conservators. New Act § 24 111 3, 4.
"' See also text infra under the heading of "Shareholder Liability For Illegal
Distributions" for other situations where shareholders may be liable.
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Beginning about 1800,290 a number of states, in an effort to afford
creditors a "cushion" of substance, enacted constitutional29 or statu-
tory provisions regulating the quantity and quality of consideration
for which shares might be issued. The courts, soon faced with contro-
versies involving shares issued in violation of these requirements, found
that the provisions did not state what consequences were to follow from
illegal issues and hence were forced to apply general principles of law
and equity to resolve the questions presented. They interpreted the
principal purpose of the consideration requirements to have been pro-
tection of creditors292 and generally concluded that solvent corpora-
tions were estopped from seeking consideration beyond the amount
and type specified in the subscription agreement.293 Creditors of
insolvent corporations were first allowed to recover from holders of
illegally issued shares on the theory that a corporation's authorized
share capital was a trust fund dedicated to their security.24 Later, as
'Heavy reliance has been placed upon LATTrIN, CORPORATIONS ch. 9, § 6 (1959);
Cataldo, Limited Liability and Paynent for Shares, 19 U. PIr. L. REv. 727 (1958)
and Stevens, Stock Issues nder the Uniform Business Corporation Act, 13 CORNELL
L.Q. 399 (1928), in the preparation of this paragraph.
" See, e.g., PA. CoNsT. art. 16, § 7 which states that "no corporation shall issue
stocks or bonds except for money, labor done, or money or property actually received;
and all fictitious increase of stock or indebtedness shall be void...." Compare WASH.
CONST. art. 12, § 6 which limits the quality requirements to bonds or other obliga-
tions (see text supra following note 143) but does contain the last clause of the
Pennsylvania provision. Generally, these clauses have not proved effective in dealing
with watered stock for the word "fictitious" has been narrowly construed, and the
word "void" has been read as "voidable." See DODD & BAKER, CASES ON BUSINESS
AssocrATioNs 923 (1940); see also Cataldo, supra note 290, at 757-59. Indeed,
if the language of these clauses were applied literally, a shareholder might be able
to defend against watered stock liability on the ground that his shares were so
completely void that no liability attached. See Stone v. Hudgens, 129 F. Supp. 273
(W.D. Okla. 1955). Also, questions would arise as to the holder's rights as a share-
holder and a solvent corporation's right to cancel watered shares. See BAKER & CARY,
CASES ON CORPORATIONS 826 (3d unabr. ed. 1959); see also WASH. REV. CODE §
23.01.190 (1958) which provides that shares allotted in violation of title 23 shall
not be invalid.
"- Innocent shareholders, suing in their own or the corporate name, could sue for
rescission of the transaction by which the corporation issued shares for illegal
consideration. But apart from the promoter's cases, (see BAKER & CARY, CASES ON
CORPORATIONS 798-80 (3d unabr. ed. 1959) for a note comparing promoter's liability
and watered stock liability), shareholders could not sue to have the guilty shareholder
contribute additional consideration to a solvent corporation. See Cataldo, supra note
290, at 743-44.
' See Cataldo, supra note 290, at 745-47.
'This theory is merely one aspect of the broader trust fund doctrine that the
assets of an insolvent corporation constitute a trust fund for the benefit of its
creditors. See, e.g., Wood v. Dummer, 30 Fed. Cas. 435 (No. 17944) (C.C.D. Me.,
1824); Ellis & Sayre, Trust Fund Doctrine Revisited, 24 WASH. L. REv. 44 (1949).
In the case of watered stock, the courts implied a promise to pay to the corporation
the par value of shares in money or its equivalent which could not be released for
less than full consideration. This promise was an asset of the corporation and thus
part of the fund to be realized. See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 349 (1946). Under
this theory, the better cases held creditors who extended credit prior to the share
issuance, those extending credit thereafter, and even those creditors who gave credit
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defects in the trust fund theory were recognized,2 9 recovery was
limited to those creditors who could be said to have relied upon the
false representation that when par value shares were issued full pay-
ment had been made in the quality of consideration required.296  And
legislatures began to adopt statutes imposing liability upon share-
holders whose shares were not fully paid.297 Most courts interpreted
statutes of this nature to be merely declaratory of the common law,29
but some viewed them as overruling the fraud theory and substituting
a new statutory obligation on shareholders to pay the amount and type
of consideration required for shares. 299 Regardless of the theory pur-
sued, however, the common inquiry was when shares were fully paid.
A few courts concluded that shares were fully paid only when the
value of the consideration tendered was determined by the court to be
in fact equal to the amount of shares issued. °0° To overcome this
harsh penalization of even good faith mistakes, most legislatures
adopted provisions making the directors' valuation of property re-
ceived for shares conclusive in the absence of fraud in the trans-
action.301
The old act made it quite clear that shareholders had no statutory
obligation other than to comply with the terms of their subscription
contracts. 2  Valuations placed upon property received as considera-
with knowledge of the watered stock, were protected. See, e.g., Williams v. Cham-
berlain, 123 Ky. 150, 94 S.W. 29 (1906).
'; The theory is now widely discredited because of the lack of a res, or even a
contract to supply a res. See, e.g., LATTiN, CoRPoRaTrINs 404 (1959).
"See, e.g., Hospes v. Northwestern Mfg. & Car Co., 48 Minn. 174, 50 N.W.
1117 (1892). Under the theory, only subsequent creditors without knowledge of the
water were protected. See Cataldo, supra note 290, at 754-55.
, See, e.g., N. J. Rev. Stat. 1877, p. 175; Gen. Stat 907, referred to in Easton
Nat'l Bank v. American Brick & Tile Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 732, 64 Atl. 917, 920 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1906).
" See Cataldo, supra note 290, at 758-59.
"' See, e.g., Easton Nat'l Bank v. American Brick & Tile Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 732,
64 Atl. 917, 920 (Ct. Err. & App. 1906). The statutory obligation theory assumes
that if shareholders are to obtain limited liability through incorporation, they must
give creditors, as a substitute for personal liability, the full par value of shares for
which they have subscribed. This obligation obtains in spite of any agreement with
the company. See, e.g., Du Pont v. Ball, 11 Del. Ch. 430, 106 Atl. 39 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
Under this theory, prior or subsequent creditors can recover. Ibid.
See, e.g., William E. Dee Co. v. Proviso Coal Co., 290 Ill. 252, 125 N.E. 24
(1919).
"i See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32 § 157.18; 1 MODEL Acr ANNr. § 18 ff 2.02(5) (b);
and discussion of New Act § 19 1 3, in text supra at note 244.
"'WAsH. Rnv. CODE § 23.01.200(1) (1958). WAsH. Rv. CODE § 23.01.200(2)
(1958) provides: "A shareholder of a corporation formed under this chapter shall
not be personally liable for any debt or liability of the corporation except every
shareholder is individually and personally liable for the debts and liabilities of the
corporation to the full amount unpaid upon any subscription to shares of stock made
by him." This provision, which is based on WAsH. CoNsT. art. 12, § 4, may be
interpreted to provide the creditors with a direct right against shareholders for
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tion for shares were conclusive as far as statutory liability was con-
cerned,303 but a person (whether a creditor or an investor) misled by
fraudulent overvaluations could sue in tort and show "the true value
provided he can establish the defendant's intent to deceive the plaintiff
and the fact of plaintiff's deception."3 4 Hence, the act specifically
disavowed the statutory obligation theory in favor of a fraud theory.""
The New Act, in contrast, obliges shareholders to pay to the corpora-
tion the full consideration 0 6 for which the shares were to be issued ' 7
unpaid subscriptions. See 1 MODEL AcT ANN. § 23 ff 2.02(2); Ayre, The Ncuw
Washington Bu¢siness Corporation Act, 8 WAsH. L. REv. 147 (1934). In Montesano
v. Carr, 80 Wash. 384, 141 Pac. 894 (1914), however, the court reached the opposite
conclusion in the interpretation of a similar provision which specifically mentioned
liability of the shareholder to the corporation's creditors for the amount of unpaid
share subscriptions. Although the court noted the similarity between the particular
provision in question and WAsH. CONsT. art. 12, § 4, it did not answer the question
whether the constitutional provision was intended to provide creditors a direct right
against shareholders in such circumstances. It seems clear, however, that the court
must have believed that the constitution did not grant creditors a direct right against
statutory interpretation question. The New Act is quite clear that creditors shall
not have a direct right against shareholders. See New Act § 24 'f 1 limiting the
shareholder's obligation to payment to the corporation. In proceedings to liquidate
a corporation, the court may appoint a receiver to collect unpaid amounts on shares.
See New Act § 101.
WAsH. REv. CODE § 23.01.170(1) (a) (1958).
', Stevens, supra note 290, at 420; see also 9 U.L.A. 164 (1957).
' It also appears that the draftsmen's intent was to restate the fraud theory in terms
of the law of deceit. See 9 U.L.A. 164 (1957). Unfortunately, no case has ever been
tried in any of the Uniform Act jurisdictions involving the provision and thus it
cannot be determined how results might vary under this characterization, from the
results under the classic fraud theory on watered stock issues.
The Washington cases dealing with watered stock issuances before the effective
date of the Uniform Act almost uniformly designate the theory on which they are
proceeding as "trust fund." See, e.g., Johns v. Clother, 78 Wash. 602, 139 Pac. 755
(1914) ; Adamant Mfg. Co. v. Wallace, 16 Wash. 614, 48 Pac. 415 (1897) ; and Turner
v. Bailey, 12 Wash. 634, 42 Pac. 115 (1895). But in Johns v. Clothier, supra, at 609,
139 Pac. at 758-59 the court also held that "the constitution and the statute create a
liability as a matter of law to the extent of the par value of the stock... " And in
Beddow v. Huston, 65 Wash. 585, 118 Pac. 752 (1911), and Connor v. Robinson, 137
Wash. 672, 243 Pac. 849, 246 Pac. 758 (1926) it was held that a creditor must plead
and prove his lack of knowledge of the water at the time he extended credit. But
see Gordon v. Cummings, 78 Wash. 515, 139 Pac. 489 (1914) where the court allowed
a creditor prior in time to the issuance of the watered shares to recover. See
generally Comment, The Rights of Corporate Creditors Upon Unpaid and Watered
Stock Subscriptions, 16 WAsr. L. REv. 238 (1941).
' Israels, Problens of Par and No-Par Shares: A Reappraisal, 47 COLumX. L.
REv. 1279, 1292 (1947) states: "no case has been found which speaks in terms of stock
watering liability either upon a subscriber or a director because of a deficiency in
the value of the property or services received by the corporation for either type of
shares where the overvaluation appears on the balance sheet as surplus rather than as
capital." A court could easily reach a contrary result under the language in New
Act § 24, as Israels later notes. See id. at 1298.
10 New Act § 24 ff 1.
It would have been helpful had the statute stated whether solvent corporations could
bring actions under the new provision, and, if so, under what circumstances. Because
of the problems of contract theory inherent in allowing the corporation to collect more
consideration for shares it issued as fully paid, most courts have not permitted a
solvent corporation to recover. See. e.g., Scovill v. Thayer, 105 U.S. 143 (1881) ; and
Cataldo; .rpra note 290, at 745-47. Two cases, however, have held bonus shares
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and thus seems to adopt the statutory obligation theory. °0
The choice between the statutory obligation theory and the fraud
theory involves essentially a policy determination as to the scope of
watered shareholders' liability in the event of corporate insolvency,
for few, if any, creditors can meet the rigorous requirements of the
fraud theory while all creditors are potentially eligible under the statu-
tory obligation theory.309 The desirable scope of liability would seem
in turn to depend upon an evaluation of the evil currently posed by
share watering.310 Few cases have involved the problem since the
advent of no-par shares and the federal securities acts,3 ' but it is diffi-
cult to determine whether this absence of controversy is the result of
reduced stock watering, misconceptions as to possible share watering
liability with no-par shares, 312 or the increasing difficulty in bringing
an action under the fraud theory.1 3 It is hard to believe, however,
assessable by a solvent corporation where the holders of the shares were the ones who
urged the assessment. Maclary v. Pleasant Hills, Inc., 109 A.2d 830 (Del. Ch. 1954) ;
and Scully v. Automobile Finance Co., 12 Del. Ch. 174, 109 Atl. 49 (1920). In juris-
dictions where cancellation is a distinct possibility (see WASHa CONST. art. 12, § 4),
the provisions in question would allow the courts to fit the remedy to the situation
and would be more consistent with the statutory obligation theory. However, blanket
permission for corporate recovery in such circumstances would raise obvious prob-
lems of possible benefit for guilty shareholders. Compare the problems raised by
Justice Holmes in Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Lewisohn, 210
U.S. 206 (1908).
' The consideration for which the shares were to be issued is defined in New
Act § 18 as the price fixed for the shares. Payment of full consideration in this
context would appear to mean that the payment valued by the directors in good faith
must equal the price. If it does not, then New Act § 24 liability would come into
play. This interpretation has been placed on the new provision by the Texas Bar
Committee. See 3A TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 2.21 (1956). No Illinois case has con-
sidered the problem since the adoption of the act there in 1933. See ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 32, § 157.23 (1963). In view of California's experience with an attempted adop-
tion of the statutory obligation theory, perhaps the statute should have made the
adoption crystal dear. The legislature there adopted several changes in the Califor-
nia Corporations Code for the purpose of adopting the statutory obligation theory.
See BALLANTINE & STERLING, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAWS § 126 (1949). These
provisions, however, did not explicitly adopt the theory but instead provided that
shares should be issued for less than par value and that a shareholder would be liable
to the corporation for unpaid shares. In Bing Crosby Minute Maid Corp. v. Eaton,
46 Cal. 2d 484, 297 P.2d 5 (1956), the court held that these provisions were common
to states following the fraud theory and could not be interpreted to indicate the
legislature's intent to overrule that theory in favor of the statutory obligation theory.
See notes 296 & 299 supra.
a For a lengthy discussion of possible evils in connection with stock watering,
see DODD, STOCK WATERING 14-27 (1930).
na For example, no case has arisen in Illinois (see note 308 supra) nor in any
of the jurisdictions following the Uniform Act. See also BAKER & CARY, CASES ON
COarPORTIONS 792 (3d unabr. ed. 1959).
' See Israels, Problems of Par and No-Par Shares: A Reappraisal, 47 CoLum.
L. REv. 1279 (1947) ; see also Berle, Problems of No-Par Stock, 25 CoLum. L. Rxv.
43 (1925); Bonbright, The Dangers of Shares Without Par Value, 24 CoLJm. L.
RU. 449 (1924).
'For a time, it was presumed that creditors had relied upon the misrepresenta-
tion arising out of the issuance of watered stock. See the discussion of the point in
Ballantine, Stockholders' Liability in Minnesota, 7 MINN. L. REv. 79, 90-91 (1923).
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that balance sheet inflation does not still occur and that this practice
would not be discouraged by an effective state liability deterrent.1
Thus, the legislature's choice of the statutory obligation theory is clear-
ly defensible.3 15
[To be continued in a subsequent issue of the Review.]
But see Bing Crosby Minute Maid Corp. v. Eaton, 46 Cal. 2d 484, 297 P.2d 5 (1956)
where the court required the creditors to prove their reliance upon the misrepresenta-
tion. Few creditors in fact rely on such misrepresentations, see BAKER & CARY,
CASES ON CORPORATIONS 823 (3d unabr. ed. 1959), and, if they did, one wonders
whether such reliance would be justifiable in view of modern credit practices.
"' Israels, supra note 312, at 1297-1300 discusses the problems of balance sheet
inflation and various existing remedies therefor under the Federal Securities Act.
" The general approach of the statutory obligation theory is consistent with the
fundamental notion that a shareholder's capital contribution has been deemed by the
legislature to be a substitute for his personal liability and that gross irregularities
in making the contribution will cause loss of the liability limitation. See BALLAN-
TINE, supra note 313, at 89-90; LATrIN, CORPORATIONS ch. 2 (1959).
Cataldo, supra note 290, at 776, suggests that the watered shares problem can be
solved by requiring, with appropriate sanctions, a report of the consideration paid
for shares to be filed in a central registry. See also WASH. Ray. CODE § 23.01.180(1958) ; DODD, STOCK WATERING 307 (1930) ; Stevens, supra note 290, at 419. Cataldo
would make the valuation conclusive as to creditors, apparently on the concept of
constructive notice. Publicity of the consideration received would seem to be a
valuable part of any statute controlling watered stock but short of some device for
effectively communicating this information to creditors, which seems impossible,
it is not clear why publication should deprive creditors of any right against the
watered shareholders.
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